

## **Addendums**

### Addendum 1: Daniel Greenberg CB on the legislative context

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#### **FOOTBALL DISORDER LEGISLATION**

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##### **Part 1**

##### **Introduction**

1. I am asked—
  - (a) to assess the adequacy of key legislation relating to, or capable of applying to, football-related disorder; and
  - (b) to suggest an approach to legislative reform.
2. A range of offences applies to the behaviour of spectators (or would-be spectators) at football stadiums. Annex 1 lists key offences, some specifically limited to football or sporting events, and some of general scope, but with potential application to those events.
3. I am asked to consider specifically legal limitations in respect of three matters:
  - (a) Football Banning Orders;
  - (b) Tailgating at football grounds; and
  - (c) Recklessly endangering lives.



4. References in this note to the “CPS Guidance” are references to the Legal Guidance issued by the Crown Prosecution Service – *Football Related Offences and Football Banning Orders*.<sup>1</sup>

## **Part 2**

### **Existing Law**

#### **Football banning orders**

5. Football banning orders (“FBOs”) are made under section 14A or 14B of the Football Spectators Act 1989 (“FSA 1989”).
6. The scope of and procedure for FBOs are rehearsed in outline at Annex 1.
7. The class of “relevant offences” for the purposes of obtaining an FBO is wide. In particular—
  - (1) It includes some general offences, including section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 which is a wide offence of using “threatening or abusive words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour” or displaying “any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening or abusive”, in each case “within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress”.
  - (2) It contains a list of relevant offences which potentially covers a large range of disorderly activity, but in order to trigger the FBO regime there generally has to be some connection with a football context, as specified in Schedule 1 to the FSA 1989.
  - (3) It covers a number of specific sports-related offences, including an offence under section 2 or 2A of the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985

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<sup>1</sup> Updated 2 October 2019 – [https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/football-related-offences-and-football-banning-orders#\\_Toc21085021](https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/football-related-offences-and-football-banning-orders#_Toc21085021); note that the Guidance is now out of date in relation to certain matters, and is drawn on in this note in relation to prosecution policy and should not be relied upon as an accurate statement of the present law.

(alcohol, containers and fireworks) committed by the accused at a regulated match or while entering or trying to enter the ground.

(4) It includes a number of offences directly involving alcohol, including the general offence of being found drunk in a public place under section 12 of the Licensing Act 1872.

(5) It does not include specific offences relating to drugs, except to the very limited extent that it includes an offence under section 4 or 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (driving etc. when under the influence of drink or drugs or with an alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit) committed while the accused was on a journey to or from a relevant football match, and in respect of which the court makes a declaration that the offence related to football matches.

8. The fact that the Schedule specifically includes offences under sections 4 and 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 which are capable of being committed by being under the influence of drugs as well as alcohol, makes it perhaps surprising that the wider alcohol-related offences in the Schedule are not replicated in respect of drugs. The policy aim is presumably to target people who are not in control of their actions as a result of self-induced states, which presumably applies to drugs as much as to alcohol

### **Tailgating**

9. Tailgating (or piggy-backing) generally refers to the practice of a person without a ticket entering a football stadium behind a ticket-holder. But the same considerations will apply to other methods of entering a football stadium without a ticket (such as pushing aside or climbing barriers).
10. When the Football Spectators Act 1989 was originally enacted, the list of relevant offences permitting the making of an FBO included the offences under section 2, which related to unauthorised attendance at designated football matches. That would have been of particular significance in relation to tailgating, not in terms of initial prevention but in terms of deterrence and prevention of repeat behaviour. But section 2 was never

brought into force, and was eventually repealed by the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006.

11. There is therefore at present no football-specific legal consequence of tailgating.
12. It is true that a person who enters a stadium without a ticket for the match or another legal reason to be there is a trespasser. But trespass is not a criminal offence outside residential premises, and it does not attract any enforcement mechanisms that are likely to be particularly effective in the context of football disorder.
13. There are certain criminal offences involving trespass that could be relevant in some instances of tailgating. Annex 2 lists offences that may be of relevance in certain football tailgating situations; but each has evidential hurdles and none of them triggers an FBO.
14. It might be possible to prosecute a tailgater for aggravated trespass under s.68 or s.69 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 as noted in Annex 2. But the offences require specific evidential hurdles to be overcome, and it may be that the penalties available – standard criminal penalties on conviction – would be less effective in the long-term than the imposition of an FBO is likely to have on a football fan and may therefore be less of a deterrent.
15. Significantly, sections 68 and 69 are not relevant offences for the purposes of imposing an FBO.
16. In essence, therefore, unauthorised entry to football grounds does not attract specific enforcement measures (in the absence of accompanying disorderly conduct that could be addressed by an FBO as discussed above) and is unlikely to have long-term consequences sufficient to deter repetition or emulation.

### **Recklessly endangering lives**

17. Disorderly activity by spectators, or would-be spectators, at football grounds often involves recklessly endangering lives (including pulling at fire doors, surging through barriers, or attempting to break down fire doors).
18. Much behaviour of this kind is likely to involve an element of destruction or damage to property, in which case it will constitute an offence under section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. That is a serious offence with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, although its very severity makes it unlikely to be deployed in relatively trivial situations.
19. More significantly in practice, section 14C of the FSA 1989 defines “violence” as including violence against persons or property. Therefore any form of recklessly dangerous behaviour that involves violence against property, is a potential trigger for an FBO, either by action of the police under section 14B or following a relevant conviction in accordance with section 14A.
20. Again, however, there is no specific mechanism in the legislation for dealing with recklessly dangerous behaviour, where it does not specifically involve violence to people or property (which could be the case for some of the most dangerous behaviour).

### **Part 3**

#### **Analysis of Overall Efficacy**

##### **Sufficiency of the FBO regime**

21. In considering the efficacy of the existing law in relation to football disorder, the starting point is to assume that the policy drivers combine the needs of prevention, deterrence and proper punishment.
22. There is some evidence to suggest that FBOs deliver effective protection in the way of prevention of disorder, and for that reason also carry deterrent effect. In particular, the CPS Guidance takes this for granted—

“For most supporters it is the thought of receiving a FBO that they fear most and, as such, its deterrent effect cannot be under-estimated.”

23. For that reason, restrictions and limitations on the use of FBOs should be measured against the policy objectives of FBOs and justified accordingly.

24. On that basis—

(1) It is difficult to see any policy rationale for the very limited extent to which drugs-related disorderly behaviour is addressed by the FBO regime, as discussed above. With disorder today being as likely to be fuelled by drugs as by drink, this is a limitation that deserves reconsideration.

(2) The application of football-specific provisions listed in Annex 1 to matches that come under the definition of a “regulated football match” in the Football Spectators (Prescription) Order 2004<sup>2</sup> is also open to consideration. Not all football disorder is necessarily confined to regulated matches. It is for consideration whether the legislative policy should focus on safety implications and requirements, rather than institutional criteria relating to the football industry.

25. An advantage of the FBO regime is the flexibility of its application to a wide range of behaviours (particularly by way of police application under section 14B). The CPS Guidance draws attention to the potentially broad scope of the regime and its application to matters that might otherwise not appear criminally significant—

“In all cases the prosecutor should ensure that the Court is made aware of the impact of violence and disorder at and around football matches. What might

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<sup>2</sup> Football Spectators (Prescription) Order 2004 (S.I. 2004/2409); made under powers in sections 14, 18 and 22A of the Football Spectators Act 1989 and section 3 of the Football (Disorder) Act 2000; amended by the Football Spectators (Prescription) (Amendment) Order 2006 (S.I. 2006/761); the Football Spectators (Prescription) (Amendment) Order 2010 (S.I. 2010/584) and the Football Spectators (Prescription) (Amendment) Order 2013 (S.I. 2013/1709). Regulated matches in England and Wales mainly consist of any association football match in which either team is a member of the Football League, the Football Association Premier League, the Football Conference or the Welsh Premier League, or the Scottish Professional Football League; there are other significant classes of match falling within the definition, including national representative team matches.

appear to be an isolated incident by a person of good character (e.g. running on the pitch) could be the trigger for more widespread disorder. The Football Intelligence Officer preparing the evidence in support of the application should provide a statement setting out the necessity for the order to include the level of football related disorder to which the defendant/respondent is contributing and its impact in the area concerned.”

26. Tailgating and recklessly dangerous behaviour could, therefore, be addressed under the FBO regime even in respect of isolated incidents, such as jumping over a turnstile, as the trigger for more widespread disorder falls within the requirements for making a FBO under s.14B. The lack of specific enforcement mechanisms in respect of football-related tailgating and reckless behaviour should be considered in that context.

### **Lack of strategic coherence**

27. Compared to the law of transport safety and security, football disorder law taken as a whole appears to lack policy coherence and strategy.
28. Transport law is an obvious point of comparison, not only because of the practical links between football disorder and transport disorder, but also because the key challenges of controlling large crowds in public and semi-public places under conditions of limited supervision are the same.
29. Transport law has a wide range of criminal and regulatory control mechanisms for dealing with disorderly and dangerous behaviour.
30. In institutional terms, the policing provisions of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”) centering around a dedicated police service provide an element of strategic control that is not found in relation to football disorder.
31. In substantive terms, most areas of transport safety law treat drugs and alcohol as being equally dangerous and requiring the same range of preventative and deterrent measures: see, for example, Parts 4 (shipping: alcohol and drugs) and 5 (aviation: alcohol and

drugs) of the 2003 Act, and Part 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (principal road safety provisions).

32. In terms of sentences, too, transport offences involving danger to life can result in sentences significantly exceeding anything generally available in the context of football disorder, even in contexts where the dangerous behaviour has not caused injury or loss of life. Note the wide range of maximum penalties prescribed under Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.

### **Fixed penalties**

33. As a quicker and more certain alternative to prosecution, fixed penalty notices are of increasing importance in a range of policing contexts, including transport policing.
34. Part 1 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 allows a constable who has reason to believe that a person aged 18 or over has committed a range of offences to give the person a penalty notice in respect of the offence, as an alternative method of dealing with the offence to prosecution.
35. As a method of controlling low-level disorderly behaviour these fixed penalty notices have a number of advantages, being instant in their effect, difficult to evade and not requiring complicated evidential preparation.
36. They have disadvantages too, notably the lack of the deterrent aspect for a criminal of being convicted of a criminal offence. But they are, at any rate, a useful tool for police to have as an option in disorder-control situations.
37. The range of offences in respect of which penalty notices can be given under the 2001 act includes a number of those identified in Annex 1 as relevant to football disorder including, in particular, section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 – behaviour likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress.

38. The Ministry of Justice Statutory Guidance in relation to Penalty Notices for Disorder<sup>3</sup> expressly notes at paragraph 3.9 that penalty notices will not in general be appropriate “for any football related offences”. The guidance does not explain the rationale for this omission. The CPS Guidance says: “Simple Cautions or Penalty Notices for Disorder will hardly ever be appropriate for football-related offences. ... Football Banning Orders (FBO) on conviction cannot be obtained on the back of any out-of-court disposals”. It may be that the lack of express linkage to the FBO regime is the primary rationale for both sets of guidance discouraging penalty notices in this area.
39. Given their widespread use in transport contexts, however, and their evidential and timing advantages compared to prosecution, it may be that the application of fixed penalty notices for football disorder is worth reconsidering.
40. (The fact that not only constables are able to issue penalty notices under the 2001 Act but, in certain cases, Police Community Support Officers and other classes of enforcement officer, could make this regime attractive for football-related disorder, given the impracticability of having a dedicated police force or body along the lines of that for transport under the 2003 Act.)

## **Cautions**

41. The greater use of cautions, including conditional cautions, could also be considered.
42. Cautions have the same timing and simplicity advantages as fixed penalty notices, and they have some additional advantages of flexibility.
43. In that respect, the CPS Guidance says—

“Conditional cautions may be available where the suspected offence is not a hate crime or an offence of domestic abuse. Conditional cautions should be reserved for minor offences committed by persons who have no previous record of football related, public order, assault or criminal damage offences. "Previous

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<sup>3</sup> Issued under section 6 of the 2001 Act on 24 June 2014.



record" is not confined to previous convictions, but can include penalty notices for disorder, stop checks and intelligence that indicates that action is needed to prevent football related violence and disorder.

“Football Banning Orders (FBO) on conviction cannot be obtained on the back of any out-of-court disposals. Where, however, an offender fails to comply with a conditional caution in relation to a football related offence, they will be liable for an application for a FBO to be made should the original offence be prosecuted. The fact that such a disposal was made could be used as evidence to support a civil application for an order. Where a person is convicted of a relevant offence (see below) and there are reasonable grounds for believing that a FBO would help to prevent violence or disorder at regulated football matches, a condition caution would not be appropriate.

“Prosecutors should have regard to the Director's Guidance on Adult Conditional Cautioning in deciding whether such a disposal is appropriate.”

## **Part 4**

### **Approaches to Legislative Reform**

#### **Rationale**

44. It is important that when Ministers consider strengthening powers in relation to football disorder, they do not approach this as if it is based on some kind of special pleading from a particular industry. The need for action arises not for the convenience of the football industry, but from the unique public health and safety, and security, challenges that the circumstances of football present.
45. The background of Hillsborough should make that argument easy for policy-makers and Ministers to appreciate.

#### **Specificity**

46. Despite its unique challenges, it is worth considering whether proposals should be advanced on a football-specific basis or linked with other sporting events and, arguably, other entertainment events including concerts and the like. As always, there is something to be said either way. A coalition of pressure for concerted action across the range of public entertainment events could make it more likely to be achieved; but would inevitably come with a dilution of specific targets and considerations in relation to football events and disorder.
47. Since legislation already acknowledges the unique challenges of football disorder, particularly in the Football Spectators Act 1989 and the Football (Disorder) Act 2000, it is probably most effective to argue for a strengthening of that sector-specific regime, addressing the weaknesses discussed above in Part 3.
48. As discussed above, however, the relationship with transport safety and security law should not be deployed merely by way of comparison: the practical links between transport control and football disorder are such as to suggest that coordinated and streamlined enforcement and control across both sectors would result in better outcomes for each.
49. In particular, legislative recommendations should include specific consideration of effective cross-contextual enforcement activity (whether by way of, or in the same way as, police service agreements under the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003, or otherwise). The emphasis must be on the creation of a coordinated strategy dealing with patterns of disorder, rather than the rather sporadic application of the FBO regime as discussed above.

### **Legislative vehicle**

50. Legislation in this area has been by way of public general Acts, not private Acts promoted by organisations, because this is as much a general public safety issue as anything else.

51. In the transport field, however, particular infrastructure benefits from byelaw-making powers – often arising out of private and local legislation – which can be particularly powerful in controlling low-level disorder in an immediate, efficient and effective way. The possibility of private legislation (perhaps promoted by affected local authorities) should not therefore be entirely overlooked.
52. In terms of public general legislative strategy, although the ideal route to legislative reform would be a Government Bill, or clauses in a wider Government Bill, this is the kind of topic on which it is common and effective to build the case for action through the use of private Members' or peers' legislation (Ballot or otherwise), aiming to culminate in a handout or programme Bill.

## **Part 5**

### **Conclusion**

53. I will be happy to expand on any matter in this note that would be helpful.

**Daniel Greenberg CB**

**14 November 2021**

**ANNEX 1**  
**KEY OFFENCES**

- (1) Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol) Act 1985, including—
  - consuming alcohol on the way to / from a game (ss.1 and 1A);
  - attempting to gain entry to a stadium whilst drunk (s.2(2)); and
  - drinking in sight of the pitch (s.2(1)(a)).
- (2) Offences against the Person Act 1861, including—
  - assault occasioning actual bodily harm (s.47); and
  - wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm (s.18).
- (3) Public Order Act 1986, including—
  - affray (s.3); and
  - fear or provocation of violence (s.4); and
  - harassment, alarm or distress (s.5).
- (4) Football (Offences) Act 1991, including—
  - throwing missiles (s.2);
  - indecent or racist chanting (s.3); and
  - going onto the playing area (s.4).

## ANNEX 2

### FOOTBALL BANNING ORDERS

#### Introduction

1. Football banning orders (“FBOs”) are made under section 14A or 14B of the Football Spectators Act 1989 (“FSA 1989”).

#### Section 14A – orders on conviction

2. Section 14A provides that where a person is convicted of a “relevant offence” and the court “is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches, it must make such an order in respect of the offender”.<sup>4</sup>
3. If a person is convicted of a football-related offence a FBO must be made unless the court is not satisfied that a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder, in which case it must give reasons.<sup>5</sup>
4. The class of “relevant offence” for the purpose of s.14A is defined in Schedule 1 of the FSA 1989; it includes:
  - Any offence under sections 2 or 2A of the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol) Act 1985:
    - Section 2(1) makes it an offence for a person to have alcohol or an article in their possession at any time during a sporting event or while entering or trying to enter a sports ground during the period of a designated sporting event. (An “article” is any article capable of causing injury to a person struck by it, being “a bottle, can or other portable container”, or part of such an item (s.2(3)).
    - Section 2(2) provides that a person who is drunk in a designated sports ground at any time during the period of a designated sporting event or who “is drunk while entering or trying to enter such a ground at any time during the period of a designated sporting event” is guilty of an offence.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Section 14A(2) of the FSA 1989.

<sup>5</sup> Section 14A(3) FSA 1989.

<sup>6</sup> Sch.1 para.1(b) FSA 1989.

- Any offence under sections 4A or 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 (harassment, alarm or distress) committed during a period relevant to a football match to which Schedule 1 applies<sup>7</sup> at any premises while the accused was at, or was entering or leaving or trying to enter or leave, the premises.<sup>8</sup>
- Any offence involving the use or threat of violence by the accused towards another person committed during a period relevant to a football match to which Schedule 1 applies at any premises while the accused was at, or was entering or leaving or trying to enter or leave, the premises.<sup>9</sup>
- Any offence involving the use or threat of violence towards property committed during a period relevant to a football match to which Schedule 1 applies at any premises while the accused was at, or was entering or leaving or trying to enter or leave, the premises.<sup>10</sup>
- Any offence involving the use, carrying or possession of an offensive weapon or a firearm committed during a period relevant to a football match to which Schedule 1 applies at any premises while the accused was at, or was entering or leaving or trying to enter or leave, the premises.<sup>11</sup>
- Offences relating to the accused being under the influence of drink or drugs, or being found drunk in a highway or other public place, or being disorderly while drunk in a public place, or using or threatening violence towards another person while the accused was on a journey to or from a football match to which Schedule 1 applies.<sup>12</sup> While these are mentioned, they are less relevant to the current issues as they do not involve offences committed at, or on entering, the stadium.
- Any offence under the Football (Offences) Act 1991.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> That is, a “regulated football match” – see Sch.1 para.4(1) FSA 1989. For an explanation of what constitutes a period “relevant to” a football match for the purposes of Sche.1 see Sch.1 para.4(2).

<sup>8</sup> Sch.1 para.1(c).

<sup>9</sup> Sch.1 para.1(d).

<sup>10</sup> Sch.1 para.1(e).

<sup>11</sup> Sch.1 para.1(f).

<sup>12</sup> These include offences under: s.12 of the Licensing Act 1872; s.91(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967; s.1 of the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985; and sections 4, 5 or 5A of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

<sup>13</sup> Sch.1 para.1(p).

5. In the case of each offence listed as a “relevant offence”, the listing extends to the inchoate offences of attempt, conspiracy, incitement, aiding and abetting, counselling and procuring.<sup>14</sup>

### **Section 14B – police orders**

6. An FBO can also be made by way of an application by the police, British Transport Police or the DPP under section 14B of the FSA 1989. This does not require that the offender has been proved to have been involved in a football-related offence. The requirement is simply that “the respondent has at any time caused or contributed to any violence or disorder in the United Kingdom or elsewhere” (s.14B(2)).
7. The application is brought by way of a complaint to a magistrate’s court and if it is proved that the condition in s.14B(2) is met and that the court is satisfied “that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches”, the court must make a banning order (s.14B(4)).
8. The CPS Guidance notes that if there is insufficient evidence to prosecute under s.14A it might still be possible to apply for a FBO under s.14B.<sup>15</sup>

### **General**

9. Whether a FBO is made under s.14A or s.14B it will contain the same conditions and have the same effect.
10. As to the efficacy of FBOs as a deterrent for football-related offences, the CPS Guidance notes that the deterrent effect “cannot be underestimated for football supporters.”<sup>16</sup>
11. Under section 57 of the Police Act 1996 (common services) an entity known as the Football Banning Orders Authority is prescribed as the enforcing authority for the purposes of Part II of the 1989 Act.

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<sup>14</sup> Sch. 1 para.2.

<sup>15</sup> See: <https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/football-related-offences-and-football-banning-orders>.

<sup>16</sup> See: <https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/football-related-offences-and-football-banning-orders> and the section headed ‘Football Banning Orders - On Conviction – s.14A Football Spectators Act 1989’ for more detail.

### **ANNEX 3**

#### **AGGRAVATED OFFENCES POTENTIALLY RELEVANT TO TAILGATING SITUATIONS**

- **Aggravated trespass under s.68 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPO 1994)**

A person commits this offence if they trespass on land and, in relation to any lawful activity which persons are engaging in or are about to engage in on that or adjoining land, does there anything which is intended by them to have the effect: (a) of intimidating those persons or any of them so as to deter them or any of them from engaging in that activity, or (b) of obstructing that activity, or (c) of disrupting that activity.

- **Failing to comply with a direction: aggravated trespass under s.69 CJPO 1994**

If a senior police officer present at the scene reasonably believes that a person is committing, has committed or intends to commit the offence of aggravated trespass, they may direct that person to leave the land. If that person fails to leave the land as soon as practicable, or leaves and comes back again, they commit an offence.

- **Violence to secure entry under s.6 Criminal Law Act 1977**

A person who without lawful authority uses or threatens violence for the purpose of securing entry into any premises for himself or for any other person commits an offence if: a) there is someone present on those premises at the time who is opposed to the entry which the violence is intended to secure; and b) the person using or threatening the violence knows that that is the case.

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Addendum 2: Eric Stuart QPM Report



# **WEMBLEY STADIUM NEAR MISSES REPORT**

CONCLUDED

**15 November 2021**

BY

**ERIC STUART QPM, BA HONS  
GENTIAN EVENTS LTD**

FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE

**The Football Association**

and

**The Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB**

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## **WEMBLEY STADIUM 'NEAR MISS' SAFETY REVIEW (Report 3/3)**

### **1.0 INTRODUCTION AND AUTHOR**

1.1 This is the third Gentian report relating to the incidents at the European Championship Final at Wembley Stadium on Sunday 11 July 2021. The first two reports related to:

1. Whether the stadium was 'fit for purpose' and suitable to continue to host major events.
2. The levels, qualifications and experience of the stewarding and security operation at the finals.

1.2 This third report specifically examines incidents that occurred in and around the stadium and considers whether more serious outcomes might have occurred. It is by necessity speculative but is based on what did happen and explains how occurrences may have led to incidents with more serious outcomes. Whilst this incident was significant enough to have attracted worldwide media, public and government attention, any major life changing injuries, a fatality, or a multiple fatality incident, would have been considerably worse. This report considers how close the stadium and environs were to such an incident, or multiple incidents, occurring.

1.3 Eric Stuart QPM is the director and owner of Gentian Events Ltd, a specialist Crowd Safety Management Company. He holds both foundation and honours degrees in crowd safety management, is the Chair of the United Kingdom Crowd Management Association (UKCMA) and an elected board member of the Events Industry Forum (EIF). He has undertaken similar reviews before and after incidents have occurred, both in the UK and overseas. A full description of his experience can be found in the first of these reports or via LinkedIn at [Eric Stuart QPM | LinkedIn](#).

### **2.0 SCOPE AND AIMS OF THE REPORT**

2.1 Whilst the report is intended to scrutinise the safety and potential for matters to have become more serious than they otherwise became, it must be remembered that this is a review, not a criminal investigation or a coronial inquest. As such, it will not have the resources, nor the time, that either of those procedures might be furnished with.

2.2 It focusses on known events rather than speculative and random searches of footage.

### **3.0 METHODOLOGY**

3.1 As such, this report has focussed on three key areas of evidential material:

1. Interviews and paper submissions of staffing providers, both security and stewarding
2. Interviews and paper submissions of key safety staff
3. CCTV or social media footage from key areas at times referenced in the above two sources, or from other documents, where dangerous incidents are mentioned

3.2 The interview phase of this report highlighted key concerns and genuine fears from those being spoken to and I wish to pass my thanks to those who participated and 'relived' the incidents that occurred particularly on the day of the finals. I have no doubt that many found my interviews stressful and the level of emotion and passion, particularly in their concerns for the staff for whom they were responsible, was voiced very clearly.

3.3 On occasions, and where there may be uncertainty, I will refer to the use of a grid or screen grid and give a figure such as 5:9. In such cases I have 'imagined' the viewed screen to be divided into a 10:10 grid counting from the bottom left corner and across the screen and then up. So, using 5:9 would be to focus on a person halfway along the screen and very near the top. A designator of 1:1 would be in the very bottom left corner.

3.4 It should be noted that in places I have estimated numbers of those who have entered through a gate. This is not an accurate figure but intended as indicative in terms of the danger they posed as they rushed through: sometimes tripping, slipping and falling and sometimes trampling over others. I am aware that there is other work underway in terms of estimating total numbers during incursions and that is where accuracy of figures will lie, not within this report.

3.5 I have also considered the question as to whether a suggested figure of a quarter of a million people had attended Wembley that day. I do not find this figure to be credible. I base this on a very rough, but generous, assessment of available space along Olympic Way and in spaces such as Arena Square. In total this space amounts to around, but not much more than, 40,000 square metres. That means to achieve one quarter of a million people, all these spaces would have been full to a density in excess of 6 P/M<sup>2</sup>. There is no evidence that such densities occurred anywhere, and most certainly not everywhere. Every picture and video I have seen at various times during the day shows some small areas of 5-6 P/M<sup>2</sup> at most, but the vast majority of areas permit free movement of people passing through, indicative of densities not exceeding 2-3 P/M<sup>2</sup>, and large spaces are almost empty. As a very rough estimate, and this has not been studied in detail, I would suggest densities from where the ground could be seen averaged around 2P/M<sup>2</sup> to 2.5P/M<sup>2</sup> suggesting a total number not exceeding 100,000 and considerably fewer once gates were opened and people had entered.

3.6 In my assessment above, I have not considered roads such as Empire Way, Fulton Road or Engineers Way as these would have been purely transitory roads for those intending Olympic Way as their destination. The only exception would be pockets gathered outside pubs or off-licenses who, seeing crowds ahead and without tickets, may have loitered longer near such attractive options.

#### **4.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

4.1 I am convinced, based upon the witness testimony, and CCTV and social media footage viewed during this review, that while the scenes witnessed on 11 July were appalling, they might well have had a considerably worse outcome.

4.2 There is no doubt in my mind that a series of incidents occurred that were a sequence of very near misses and any one of these could have led to significant injuries or death(s) occurring. I have detailed and evidenced several ways in which crowd fatalities can occur, and then related some of them to the scenes that occurred at Wembley. I have focussed primarily on the final between Italy and England as this is the focus of the report. While some of the scenes at previous games might have indicated what was likely to occur at the final, they were not of the scale or frequency of those at the final.

4.3 I have not been asked to comment on who might or might not have been responsible and whilst there were some indicators as to the behaviours of the fans for the final, I have seen no clear evidence that suggests those in charge could or should have expected the scenes or scale of behaviour that occurred. If there is a failure, then it seems one of a 'failure of imagination' as to how dangerously and irresponsibly some of those attending Wembley, particularly but not exclusively those without tickets, would behave. However, I must pass comment on the appalling behaviour of some the 'fans' which is seen to be almost commonplace throughout the footage and statements. It can only be described as extraordinary and, to my knowledge, unprecedented.

4.4 The levels of alcohol consumption and drug abuse witnessed by officials exceeds the experience of anyone and whilst some might say this was predictable, I have seen no evidence that anyone did predict it until armed with the expertise of hindsight. Certainly, those interviewed here had a sense that it might get worse as the finals progressed, but none thought it could, or would, become as serious as it became.

4.5 Historically, there has been a tendency to 'blame the victims' when serious incidents occur in crowds, and I have always advocated a requirement for a deeper examination of the facts. In fact, it is generally poor planning or weak arrangements that have led to many incidents occurring. Such incidents where fans were initially blamed include Hillsborough and Ibrox, when clearly there were other factors and persons responsible and to blame. Even the review into the Bradford Fire examined fan behaviour at football, when the actual causes of the deaths was a fire in a wooden stadium, which clearly was not the fault of any football supporter.

4.6 It is too easy to blame the victims for the consequences of their actions but, upon examination of the facts, statements, and interviews in this case, it is hard to come to any conclusion other than that an unparalleled confluence of circumstances came together to cause unprecedented and unpredicted behaviours outside and at Wembley Stadium, as well as in many other parts of London that day. Fundamentally, it is the behaviour of those who attended who caused the issues of the day. It is also hard to conclude otherwise that those behaviours led to a significant number of incidents and injuries to staff, and a smaller but significant number of incidents that might have been far more serious, without luck and some very difficult decisions and hard work by staff.

## **5.0 POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS CROWD SCENARIOS**

### **5.1 BACKGROUND**

5.1.1 There are many ways in which crowds can become dangerously and physically unstable when certain circumstances occur. As such they can then find themselves inadvertently in danger of serious injury or death. Within this report, I exclude phrases such as 'stampede' or 'panic' because both are incorrectly used by news media and film makers to explain human behaviour in an inaccurate and unscientific manner. I will seek only to explain the behaviours and circumstances generally recognised by crowd management practitioners, psychologists, and academics.

5.1.2 I have also focussed on those matters realistic to this crowd at this event. Whilst an escape from a fire within a nightclub can lead to crush fatalities, it is not relatable to the physical environment or crowd demographic and dynamic of this event. Such matters I have disregarded. Therefore, the following (from 5.2 onwards) is a list of circumstances that might have occurred at Wembley. It is not a list of things that did happen. These follow at Paragraph 6.2 onwards.

5.1.3 It should be noted that in most of these circumstances, both physical and psychological factors play a significant part. I do not examine the latter in detail but there are a number that must be mentioned.

5.1.4 The 'motivation' factor of the crowd will lead to those most determined to seek to gain advantage. With a high level of demand to escape or survive (or in this case to view a 'must see' game) then high levels of motivation would be present. Other factors driving such behaviour would include: the media coverage, the first final in 55 years, the realistic chance of victory, the previous defeat of Germany, wanting to be 'part of history'. These might all have featured in different ways for different people but would have been strong motivational factors for many.

5.1.5 It has also been suggested, and I tend to agree, that there was a 'tease' factor for those travelling, arriving, and then loitering, with no other means of watching the game close to the ground. They would be driven to change that situation. They knew very well that some 25,000 seats would remain empty. For some, this would have felt upsetting and infuriating, and they might have been inspired to overcome security to take advantage of an 'unfair' situation knowing that once inside, there was a better than normal chance of finding an empty seat and hiding in plain sight. Psychological factors such as the 'in group and out group' mentality would have been at play, making people envious of those wealthy and sufficiently 'entitled' to get a ticket when they could not.

5.1.6 Alcohol and drugs were clearly present in very high quantities. These would have desensitised the emergency senses of many of those involved. Alcohol has a disinhibitory impact on behaviours and those consuming it, especially if combined with drugs such as cocaine, will take greater risks and be less aware of the negative outcomes of those risks to themselves and others. They will even suffer less initial pain when struck or when falling or bumping into others. This will also be the case if they become trapped and being squashed. The delay in the realising of painful crushing will also delay the reaction to it.

5.1.7 Normalcy bias is the inability to quickly accept a changing circumstance. It may lead people in dangerous situations to believe for too long that they are still safe. By the time they realise the

danger, it is too late to escape from it, as crowd density is so great that a path to safety is no longer possible. Normalcy bias is most quickly overcome if those impacted have good situational awareness, but euphoria, alcohol and drugs diminish any such awareness as the body focusses on 'the moment'. This is often the case in crowd crush scenarios at religious festivals such as the Hajj in Saudi Arabia and most recently the 2021 Lag B'Omer gathering at Mount Merion in Israel which led to the deaths of 45 orthodox Jewish men and boys.

5.1.8 In relating these factors, I do not suggest, nor do I have specific evidence, that this was the case at Wembley. But these are significant recognised traits that are highly likely to have been present.

5.1.9 In many of the cases listed, the effects are similar, and the outcomes are identical. I have not repeated those factors that are obvious outcomes where the circumstances are like those previously described.

## 5.2 EXCESS CROWDS OVERLOADED IN LARGE SPACES

5.2.1 In short, too many people are present, even in seemingly large and open spaces, at any given time. In many cases, people in these crowds suffer asphyxia whilst still standing. Pressure from people around them or when pressed against buildings, walls, railings, metal bars or fencing leads to individuals realising too late that they are unable to escape from the situation.

5.2.2 It becomes difficult to move through a crowd when densities exceed 3 people per square metre (3 P/M<sup>2</sup>). It becomes very hard to leave a crowd when densities exceed around four or five (4 - 5 P/M<sup>2</sup>). NB: This figure is highly variable because the demographic of the audience will, to some extent, dictate the physical size of the people present. A female, teenage audience at a 'boy band' music concert will take up half or less physical space than an audience of 60-year-old males at a concert by 'The Who' or 'The Rolling Stones'. Whilst the former might still be quite comfortable standing at 5 P/M<sup>2</sup>, the latter would already be running out of space by 3 P/M<sup>2</sup>.

5.2.3 Once trapped, if that pressure increases, then it becomes hard to raise the arms from the side. Even if that is achieved, the pressure from others, or other hard structures against which people are pressed, will eventually increase such that the rib cage cannot be expanded, the diaphragm cannot be lowered, and the lungs cannot be filled. Whilst generally referred to as crushing, this is more correctly known as compression (or compressive) asphyxia.

5.2.4 This is most likely to occur in crowds that have exceeded 7 or 8 P/M<sup>2</sup> (but see the previous caveat at 5.2.2: body size and behaviour is very important in this aspect).

5.2.5 The circumstances described above have featured in many multiple fatality crush scenarios worldwide, not least the Hajj fatalities in Saudi Arabia and, indeed, at Hillsborough. However, at Wembley, it is unlikely that such a prospect would occur in the relatively wide-open spaces of Olympic Way or its approaches.

### 5.3 EXCESS CROWDS OVERLOADED IN CONFINED SPACES

5.3.1 The risk to crowds in smaller confined spaces is more obvious. In any part of any building with limited entrances or exits, and particularly if one of these is locked, blocked or somehow unavailable, the risks rise significantly.

5.3.2 If any smaller confined space is full beyond capacity and others are added into the area, then crushing and fatalities can occur. I have seen no evidence that this occurred or was likely to occur at Wembley.

5.4 **DOOR WEDGING.** This is self-explanatory in that it occurs when too many people try to enter a doorway at the same time. If unmanaged and the numbers are sufficient, then the door can become wedged with the number of people trying to enter it quickly. Of course, the numbers will be relative to the door space: the bigger the door, the greater the number need to 'wedge' it.

5.4.1 If a doorway is (for instance) one metre wide, it can tolerate two people of reasonable size, with the average male being approximately 485 CM across the shoulders (the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile based upon 2020 data [Anthropometrics: Human sizes - Roy Mech](#)). But if they are both around the 60<sup>th</sup> percentile, together they will be as wide as the entrance and become wedged. Aggravating factors would include: a significant desire to 'compete' to get into the entrance, the numbers attempting to enter and the length of the passageway (assuming it is more than just a doorway). Once wedged, with more and more person pressing from behind, unlocking the wedge is extremely difficult unless the pressure can be relieved and easy access can be gained from both sides of the crush.

5.4.2 Compressive asphyxia will normally occur in these circumstances in a just few minutes.

5.5 **PROGRESSIVE CROWD COLLAPSE AND ENTRAPMENT.** At densities in excess of 5 P/M<sup>2</sup> (see caveat at 5.2.2) 'ripples' or 'crowd quakes' can run through crowds caused by the physical hydraulic effect of so many bodies being in contact with each other. It is often referred to as the domino effect, although that is misleading because initially it does not lead to people falling. However, given sufficient energy (such as dancing or someone falling) and people in very close proximity transmitting that energy onwards, it accelerates to frightening speeds and can ultimately lead to a crowd collapse with people stacked on top of each other.

5.5.1 In such circumstances, this can lead to piles of bodies on top of each other and an immediate rescue operation would be needed to save those on the bottom.



**5.6 PROGRESSIVE CROWD COLLAPSE ON STAIRCASES (INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL).** The danger of staircases is well known. The change of surface, inability to see the steps once within a crowd and risk of falling on a staircase being much higher, make staircases an area of significant concern to all crowd safety managers.

5.6.1 The movement and maintenance of a steady cadence on a staircase is much harder going upstairs, and harder still going downstairs than on the level. When crowds grow above about 3 P/M<sup>2</sup> (see caveat at 5.3.1) it is much harder to see where you are placing your feet, and far easier to trip over someone else's. People are looking down rather than ahead and often miss warning signs of danger occurring. When approaching the head of a down staircase in a crowd, it is impossible to see what is occurring just ahead of you and two steps below. Even if a fall has taken place, in the noise and chaos of a crowd, it is unlikely this would be easily picked up.

5.6.2 The deaths of the 173 people at Bethnal Green Underground in March 1943 spell out just how significant these dangers are.

**5.7 BARRIER COLLAPSE AND ENTRAPMENT/ ENTANGLEMENT.** The use of barriers of various kinds are accepted as the best means of maintaining some level of order, queuing and necessary management or control of some crowds. The correct barriers, suitably placed and managed, can be enormously beneficial to crowd safety. But if the crowd numbers or behaviour exceed the ability of the barriers to withstand them, then the barriers themselves become a hazard that can inflict injury or worse.

5.7.1 There are many barriers used in the UK and I will not describe them all. But where high density or high activity crowds are anticipated, and where crowd pressure is likely, then the favoured barrier is Mojo™ or Front of Stage (FoS) barrier. These are pressure loaded barriers and can withstand large numbers pushing or surging towards them. However, they are quite low and can easily be jumped. They can, though, be used in a configuration with a vertical reinforcement bar and polycarbonate upper panels. They cannot be moved in an emergency other than with specialist tools and teams who know how to handle them.

5.7.2 An intermediate option available is known by many names: Met, Public Order, Police or Crowd Control Barrier. It is more correctly known as an Appleby Barrier. This barrier, around the same height but of medium weight and with tubular steel construction, links together and has a triangular 'foot' which is placed on the ground with the triangle pointing away from the crowd. It offers some resistance from toppling or sliding quite so much as the third barrier below. It can be moved in an emergency but is physically quite hard to unlock and move.

5.7.3 The third and least effective is a tubular aluminium barrier known by many names such as: Ped, Pedestrian, Bike Rack, Cycle Rack or Lightweight Ped (its most used name). This barrier is lighter, longer, cheaper, and easier to install and can be moved more readily in an emergency than any of the previous two. Overall, its costs might be as much as just one third of an Appleby and only one tenth the price of an FoS Barrier (supplier dependent).

5.7.4 For a variety of reasons, including speed of deployment, speed of removal in emergencies, costs and aesthetics, the latter of these barriers is often the preferred option. However, in dense crowds, with any pulsing and pressure, these aluminium tubular barriers can bend and buckle. The top bar of these devices is generally 2.3 to 2.5 metres in length and not reinforced so they are prone to buckling. It needs no explanation that if these barriers fail and fold, those applying the pressure, generally inadvertently as they are pushed from behind, will fall with them. The 'bike rack' upright poles allow arms and legs to slip through the gaps and can result in people being trapped as the barriers fold. If combined with a crowd falling on top of the trapped person, the consequences are quite obvious, unless rescue occurs almost immediately.

5.8 **SLIP, TRIP OR FALL IN A MOVING CROWD WITH POTENTIAL TRAMPLING.** As crowd density increases, the risks of being tripped or tripping another also increase. In crowds of 4 P/M<sup>2</sup> (see caveat at 5.3.1) being able to see where you are placing your feet diminishes and the risk of tripping, slipping, and falling increases significantly. If such an incident occurs, it is likely that those immediately behind and walking/running in the same direction will see and react to the person falling. However, if the crowd flow is strong and the density sufficient, those just two or three places behind may not notice. In a loud crowded environment especially if the motivation of the crowd to progress is great, they will continue forward.

5.8.1 In such cases, it is possible that even those who saw the fall and try to stop, will themselves be knocked from those still walking behind and pushed forward, falling on or tripping over the person on the floor, adding to the 'pile'. If this continues unchecked, the fallers would spread sideways and lead to ever more people on the ground with others falling upon them. The consequences are self-evident.

5.8.2 If the pressure and speed of the crowd is sufficient, it is possible that the majority will not trip over a person already on the ground, but many will progress over them, inadvertently trampling them. There is evidence that this led to the unfortunate death of 44-year-old Jean Leary, one of those killed in the incident at the Trafalgar Square New Year's Eve celebrations in 1982 (Source: Guildhall Library reference: P/HV8198/L6D4).

5.9 **THE SELF-CRUSHING CROWD.** In this final scenario, consider a crowd travelling through a passage initially unhindered. One of two issues can lead to this scenario unfolding. The first is that the passageway has become blocked or never had an exit. Those reaching the blockage will try to communicate with those behind in order to turn around. But if noise levels are sufficient, this will not be successfully relayed.

5.9.1 Alternatively, the passage may be blocked by oncoming crowds, so they become the blockage that restricts the route. This phenomenon is directly proportionate to the width, or the route of passage, and the numbers involved. So a few dozen people travelling in opposite directions in a narrow tunnel, passageway or corridor could trigger such a phenomenon, whereas it might take many hundreds or even thousands along a wider route.

5.9.2 In essence, crowds that are directed or take routes in opposite directions come face-to-face and then become static. Those 3 to 4 deep within the crowd cannot see the problem so continue to

ease their way forward, entirely unaware they are squashing the people ahead of them. Most crowds are only able to see and be aware of those at best 4-6 persons, but often only 2-3, ahead of them, and so have no idea of the danger ahead. As those deeper in each crowd attempt to push forward, they can cause compressive asphyxia, particularly those at the point of conflict who are face-to-face with the other crowd or solid object.

5.9.3 Had any mass evacuation been necessary at Wembley on the night, it is not difficult to imagine such a circumstance occurring, as those outside, suddenly seeing fire doors open, surged to enter, and those inside tried to escape. With thousands outside motivated by drink, drugs and the 'absolute need' to see the game, and with inhibitions and empathy diminished by those same factors, and tens of thousands inside motivated by a need to escape from the 'emergency', the conflict and compression along the line of people meeting would have been catastrophic. One crowd ingressing along the same route as those egressing in a tunnel in Germany was the basic cause of 21 deaths at the Love Parade music festival in Duisburg in 2010. There are many similar examples, such as the 110 children who died in the Malta Carnival Crush of 1823.

## **6.0 POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS CROWD SCENARIOS AT THE 11 JULY FINAL**

6.1 The following is the same list as that at Paragraph 5.0, but with specific examples of circumstances which occurred that might have caused serious injury or fatalities. This is not a comprehensive list. The footage has not been examined minute by minute but the following are examples, guided by others' notes, incidents that are known to have taken place, and 'dip sampling' likely times and locations.

### **6.2 EXCESS CROWDS OVERLOADED IN LARGE SPACES**

6.2.1 There is no obvious evidence of the necessary densities that would have led to a mass fatality crush incident on Olympic Way or elsewhere during the Cup Final game on 11 July. Whilst 'pressure waves' can ripple through crowds, unless they are sufficient to knock people to the floor, there is no sustained pressure from such waves and so this is not likely to lead to compressive asphyxia.

6.2.2 In a very quick and rough estimate of available space using google maps, there is no more than 40,000 square metres available, even including areas such as Arena Square. To achieve densities of six to seven people per square metre, the numbers to achieve a significant non breathable crush effect, more than 200,000 – 250,000 persons would have been attempting to share this space at the same time and there is no evidence to support that (see paragraph 3.5 above). Even if those numbers had attended all at once and without the gates open to fill the stadium, there are more than adequate escape routes through the side roads and passages along Olympic Way which make such a circumstance highly unlikely.

6.2.3 I have no doubt that small groups felt compression upon them and experienced difficulty moving for short periods of time and small, tight knit groups may have felt some discomfort and certainly some concern. But the likelihood of a sustained compressed crowd capable of leading to compressive asphyxia in these circumstances as witnessed seem remote.

6.2.4 I am mindful that the 'timeline' refers to multiple reports on WhatsApp and elsewhere of crushing at the bottom of 'The Steps' at approximately 19:30. Examination of footage here actually shows lighter crowds than previously. Looking at these 'multiple reports', they all seem to originate in LBB WhatsApp groups, within which we know there were significant delays between messages being sent and then arriving on others logs. Reviewing footage at the bottom of the Olympic Steps, I am inclined to speculate that the crushing referred to took place closer to 18:30. Viewed from camera C50 at this time, there were indeed very high-density areas at the bottom of the Olympic Steps on the west side, with high levels of pressure being applied by those arriving from Engineers Way to those who have arrived via Olympic Way and are queueing. I refer to this later.

6.2.5 There is quite a prolonged period, as detailed below, when a large and dense crowd has to be crossed through by many hundreds of people it becomes potentially dangerous.

6.2.6 It seems likely that this is the area described by some Brent officials as being extremely challenging to move through around 19:00. There were large numbers trying to traverse this quite boisterous crowd. It would at best have been a physically hard, and for many, quite scary, situation to move through. See below:

18:49 to 19:25	Gate A	C75 and C76	The queue into gate A ceases to flow and grows rapidly until it touches the back wall behind it and is confined on two sides. Had this been a barriered queue, confined on all four sides, then density would have been sufficient to lead to a collapse, but not compression of the nature I have described.
19:04:02	Gate A	C76	Single file flows can be seen crossing the dense crowd. The necessity for people to move or be moved as people pass between them might have been sufficient to trigger an initial crowd collapse but its energy, unconfined on two sides, would have made it short lasting. That does not make it not dangerous, just less so.
19:05:05 to 19:14:50	Gate A	C76	A female at screen position 6:6 is helped from the crowd by a man. She appears to be in respiratory distress and is gasping for air. She is helped to the side by the wall nearest the turnstiles and remains there for a long period of time recovering. She had emerged from the crowd but at this stage it is not possible to track her route through it.

### 6.3 EXCESS CROWDS OVERLOADED IN CONFINED SPACES

6.3.1 This was one of the highest risk activities during the final. There are so many instances of doors being rushed or 'jibbed' that they are almost uncountable.

6.3.2 For each of these, there were large numbers of people being confined into small spaces with a high-pressure crowd pushing forward and a solid object such as a metal door, often reinforced by staff, or just staff (and occasionally police) pushing against them. Some of these incidents are listed below.

6.3.3 *This is not a criticism of Wembley.* This is one of those occasions when safety and security clash. If they had permitted substantial numbers of unticketed, unsearched, drunk, and drugged fans into the ground, then the consequences speak for themselves. There was even a risk, albeit perhaps small, that hidden amongst this crowd, and taking advantage of the situation, of a person of even greater threat, intent on some form of terrorism. Hiding a suicide vest, gun or multiple knives about their person and taking advantage of a crowd surge cannot be beyond the imagination of a terrorist. Wembley have no choice other than to balance safety, security and service and this was one occasion where it is almost impossible to find the right balance.

6.3.4 Some incidents that could have led to wedging are listed here. Undoubtedly many more are not yet viewed or even captured on camera:

Time	Location	Camera	Incident
18:46	Gate H	C275	Pass gate is breached causing over 100 people to surge through in two waves. A collapse of staff and public on floor lasts about 15 seconds. An emergency gate is then opened from the inside and another 80 or so surge through that.
18:56	Pass Gate D	C72	A prolonged jamming of the pass gate for 15 minutes as crowds are pushed back but try to enter. The duration of this compression is extremely disturbing.

19:02	Pass Gate D	C64	During the above incident, the exit gate is also breached.
19:15	Pass Gate D	C72	A coordinated opening of the door from outside by a male who does not appear to be a steward or staff but wearing a hi-vis jacket, and a simultaneous surge from a group of males. This seems planned.
19:15	Pass Gate D	C64	The inside picture of the above scenario where the door is held, and pressure applied to force the crowd back out.
19:19	Gate J Level 1	C315	Around 100 storm a gate which is forced open from the outside. Over 1 minute of compression occurs before the door is closed.
19:41	Gate H	C275	A male runs towards the fire doors just off shot, then returns back followed by 100-120 people who surge through.
19:21	Block J Pass gate	C52	A steward opens a pass gate and scores run into it, jamming the insides before being forced back out by police.
19:44, 19:46 and 19:47	Block D Pass Gate	C318	A pass gate is opened, and hundreds run into it, jamming the insides before being forced back out by stewards.
20:03	Gate C Level 1	C56	Hundreds run towards an open gate. In this case few make it before police drive them back.

#### 6.4 DOOR WEDGING

6.4.1 This risk remains for me another highly likely scenario during the final. The same incidents listed above at 6.3 are as likely to lead to door wedging as they would to crushing in confined spaces. Compressive asphyxia will normally occur in these circumstances in a just few minutes.

#### 6.5 PROGRESSIVE CROWD COLLAPSE

6.5.1 Whilst progressive crowd collapse is not uncommon at high activity music festivals, I have seen only limited evidence of such incidents in this crowd. However, the density of crowds on several occasions was sufficient, had the right trigger been in place, for such an incident to occur. Fights, or throwing of bottles or other items, could easily have triggered such an incident. Those areas where such incidents might have been likely include, but are not limited to:

Time	Location	Camera	Incident
14:54	Olympic Way	C179	Dense crowds making passage uncomfortable.
Multiple	Olympic Way	C179	Though one specific time is cited above, these scenes are repeated throughout the day at the same locations near Box Park, outside Butlers, etc.
18:00 onwards	Olympic Steps	C256	From 18:00 until restrictions are lifted, the pressure from the crowd heading east along Engineers Way is pushing against barriers and crowds for 45 minutes and is high risk.
19:57	Olympic Steps (bottom west)	C256	High density crowds are pushing against stewards and barriers and pushing sideways into an existing crowd. The risk of progressive crowd collapse here is high.

6.5.2 The danger with progressive crowd collapse is that if the energy persists, others will fall on top of those on the floor. Unless recovery occurs within a minute or two, compressive asphyxia is highly likely.

6.5.3 The danger on the occasions cited is that they all occurred in close proximity to lightweight barriers which will topple and cause further effects listed below.

## 6.6 PROGRESSIVE CROWD COLLAPSE ON STAIRCASES (INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL)

6.6.1 There are a number of instances where a staircase collapse was likely or highly likely. There may be occasions where further incidents occurred off camera or have not yet been caught without a forensic examination of all the relevant cameras.

6.6.2 I have examined some of the internal bowl footage with an expectation, based on some reports, that large numbers of standing fans in the vomitories might have led to a progressive crowd collapse in those areas. I have most closely scrutinised the time at which England scored the first goal but can see no evidence of such an incident.

6.6.3 It is worthy of note that without significant actions, such as police baton surges, the locking of the turnstiles on several occasions, and the exceptional work of the safety teams and stewards in preventing even more entering the ground, then the situation I expected to note on the vomitories may well have occurred. It is credit to all concerned that this is not the case. Those occasions where such a collapse was likely are listed below, but there are likely to be more that have not been viewed.

6.6.4 One of the most dangerous was caused by a necessary police tactic as crowds surged up the Olympic Steps and towards the stadium. The chronology below sets out how it happened. It is not my intention to criticise the actions of the officers from 19:58 below. Their leaders had seconds to decide whether to act or not in response to a large crowd charging towards them. They did not have the benefit of studying CCTV footage in detail, and the position they held meant they would have had no reasonable view down the staircase of those hundreds, perhaps thousands, still charging up the staircase, nor any concept of the numbers on it.

6.6.5 To say that police action caused the threat to crowd safety *does not mean it was wrong*. The police had to react to a dangerous and foolhardy act by thousands of attendees, many of whom we know to be drunk and some drugged. For the police to not react, or perhaps to give ground, might well have meant their own lines were soon breached and many thousands more could have attacked the turnstiles and pass gates, creating an even more dangerous situation.

Time	Location	Camera	Incident
18:07	Spanish Steps	C54	The steps have been reduced to 65% flow (either due to lack of staff or to reduce flow rates). Queues start to reach the staircase and despite attempts at a lower 'filter' point, large queues occur. Associated with the later disorder, a collapse on the staircase is feasible.
19:56:28	Olympic Steps Top	C50 and C179	A small group run off camera bottom right screen. Within 15 seconds, scores are running from different directions towards a barrier breach at the bottom of the steps. 10 seconds later it is hundreds.

19:57:26	Olympic Steps Top	C50 and C179	Half the staircase width is breached, and the Olympic Steps have hundreds climbing them (1 minute). Many run through an ineffective police filter at the top of the steps. Most police seem unaware of what is coming.
19:57:30	Olympic Steps Top	C50 and C179	Many who have reached the level turn and move back (this is caused by an off-camera police baton push).
19:57:37	Olympic Steps Top	C50 and C179	One officer (bottom right) is pulled back into line by colleagues.
19:58	Olympic Steps Top	C50 and C179	The police line at the top of the stairs, now embedded with crowd, is withdrawn. If left, it might have held back others climbing the stairs and diminished the impact of the returning crowd, slowing it before the stairhead.
19:58:12	Olympic Steps Top	C50 and C179	An officer in a red baseball cap with stick raised approaches the crowd causing scores to turn and run, triggering a chain reaction in many others.
19:58:15	Olympic Way Top	C50 and C179	The retreating crowd impact on the approaching crowd causing a significant pressure point.
19:58:26	Olympic Steps Top	C50 and C179	One hundred or so running fans reach the top of the staircase whilst others are still climbing it, causing a considerable pressure point at the top of the staircase.
19:58:38	Olympic Steps Top	C50 and C179	Two PSUs deploy in a 'fast walk' with batons raised towards crowd causing a secondary wave and considerable compression at stairhead.
19:56:47	Olympic Steps	C179 Arch	<b>Some duplication/different angles from camera C50 (above) in detail but also:</b> crowds surge forwards, and barriers from the right are pushed in front of running crowds by others joining. To the right of the picture, people are knocked over by barriers and walls climbed.
19:58:50	Olympic Steps Middle	C256 Arch NE	Crowds running upstairs are now met with crowds running downstairs, compact on the middle. The design of the steps, shallow levels and regular flat platform areas prevent anything more serious occurring but crowd compression and double direction movement with speed is extremely dangerous. <b>FIGURE 01</b>
19:59:20	Olympic Steps	C179 Arch	A man in blue runs forward as others try to attract police attention to a fallen female.
19:59:22	Olympic Steps	C179 Arch	Police push has caused significant pressure points on the right and left of staircases.
19:59:38	Olympic Steps	C179 Arch	Police enter the crowd and extract female whilst still being pushed around by the crowd. <b>FIGURE 02</b>





FIGURE 01





FIGURE 02

## 6.7 BARRIER COLLAPSE AND ENTRAPMENT/ ENTANGLEMENT:

6.7.1 There are a number of incidents I have noted where such entrapment or entanglement with barriers was not just likely but seems to have occurred. It should be noted that in most instances the barriers used are lightweight pedestrian barrier without fixed feet. The most used UK pedestrian barrier has 45° angled 'bull horn' feet such as those pictured here.



6.7.2 However, the ones chosen for Wembley have a flat foot design and the barrier has to be 'slotted' into the feet which are separate from the barrier itself.



6.7.3 In some instances, the feet are longer with multiple holes for four barriers to be attached meaning that parallel 'queue lanes' are far easier to build and maintain at equal width throughout. These can be seen deployed in footage from Olympic Steps.

6.7.4 These latter two flat foot barriers are far safer in some regards, as they are far less of a trip hazard and, if thrown, there are fewer sharp impact points likely to cause harm. But they are quite easy to disassemble and throw.



6.7.5 The paragraphs above are by means of explanation and background and are not intended as any criticism of the type of lightweight barrier deployed. Each has benefits and each has challenges.

Time	Location	Camera	Incident
18:20	Olympic Steps west side lower	C256	As early as 18:20, the bottom left of stairs comes under pressure from west lateral squeeze. Pressure is onto side of ped barrier which is not designed for weight loading.
18:30	Olympic Steps west side lower	C256	Pressure onto stewards becomes too great and lateral pressure pushes against lines and collapses barriers. Crowds are at high density and transition from stationary to moving crowds. High density remains for 14 minutes.
19:57	Olympic Steps west side lower	C256	Crowds from west along Engineers Way start to grow and pressurise the barriers on that corner of steps. At 19:58:15 people can be seen falling over barriers as others continue from behind. <a href="#">FIGURE 03</a>
20:04:32	Olympic Steps west side lower	C256	The footage of the barrier remnants can be seen as a person dances in the middle with a barrier raised. <a href="#">FIGURE 04</a>
20:24:47	Zoom in Olympic Steps	C256	Zoom in shows barriers stacked and being used as a trampoline. <a href="#">FIGURE 05</a>





FIGURE 03



FIGURE 04



FIGURE 05

Zoom in on Olympic Steps at 20:24:47 The crowd have pulled barriers apart and built a stack which they use as a 'trampoline'



## 6.8 SLIP, TRIP OR FALL IN A MOVING CROWD WITH POTENTIAL TRAMPLING

6.8.1 The table at 6.3 in the paragraph above indicates that there should have been more incidents of this nature reported and more leading to serious injury. It is possible, though, that those injured in such circumstances were unaware of just how close they came to more serious injury, that they were injured undertaking dangerous or illegal activity, and that some were under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

6.8.2 They may have been unaware that day of the extent of their injuries and, seeing the media coverage later that night and over the following days, might not have wished to admit where and how the injuries occurred, whilst possibly seeking medical attention. To this point, it is unlikely we will ever know the true extent of the number and nature of all of the injuries.

6.8.3 Most of the situations at 6.3 could have led to people falling and many clearly show they did, with others falling on them or running over the top of them. Of note are the following, although many more incidents occurred:

Time	Location	Camera	Incident
17:25:30	Spanish Steps	C54	Surge of 100 towards pedestrian (ped) barriers at top of Spanish steps causing ped barrier to collapse. <a href="#">FIGURE 06</a>
17:25:36	Spanish Steps	C54	A young male with a white t-shirt and paper crown at the centre of picture falls and is buried. Then at 17:25:45, he climbs free but has a seizure and is unconscious until 17:30:41. <a href="#">FIGURE 07</a>
17:25:40	Spanish Steps	C54	Male in blue shirt falls and numerous others then fall on top. Police change from a security role to one of rescue. 100+ more choose not to follow from stairs otherwise the situation would have been critical.
17:26:20	Spanish Steps	C54	Barriers are buckled and there are abandoned shoes on floor, this a frequent feature after fatal crowd crushes. <a href="#">FIGURE 08</a>  Compare this with the crowds at 18.15. If crowds had surged at this point, the situation would have been considerably worse.  These pictures may also indicate insufficient staff at 18.15, with only 65% of chutes open (11 chutes instead of 17). <a href="#">FIGURE 09</a>
18:45:50	Gate G	C273 (Int)	A female has been knocked down and is stepped on and fallen on by others, until a male then recovers her from the floor.
19:06:47	Gate G	C273 (Int)	Doors are pulled open from outside and crowd surges in. The crowd collapse onto floor is three to four deep in places.
19:06:53	Gate G	C273 (Int)	Second door fails.
19:06:55	Gate G	C273 (Int)	Doors fail. Female staff member (black dress) knocks head backwards on floor and is then stamped on. <a href="#">FIGURE 10</a>
19:06:56	Gate G	C273 (Int)	A man carrying a small child is swept in through the right edge of the door at grid 4:7. <a href="#">FIGURE 11</a>
19:07:01	Gate G	C273 (Int)	He falls backwards hanging on to the child but falls over those behind him as he is pushed in backwards. <a href="#">FIGURE 12</a>

19:07:03	Gate G	C273 (Int)	He is helped by a member of staff back to his feet and then recovers two other small children from the middle of the melee. <b>FIGURE 13</b>
19:07:04	Gate G	C273 (Int)	Female from 19:06:55 is recovered from floor by steward.
19:08:05	Gate G	C273 (Int)	The last people are recovered from the floor, 1 minute 20 seconds after collapsing. There is fighting in the doorway with police and staff trying to hold the line and close the doors.
19:08:52	Gate G	C273 (Int)	The crowd surge again and the doors are lost. Scores rush in, people fall and are trampled. This is slightly less serious in terms of entrapment than at 19:06:47.
19:09:19	Gate G	C273 (Int)	Doors are regained under police control.
Whats App	Gate G	Whats App	All above is supplied by one of the football players' friends or family, taken on the day from a camera phone.




FIGURE 06

Around 100 people approach the centre section





FIGURE 07















a significant inward surge of those outside.



6.9.7 The third potential circumstance is perhaps the most worrying. Had England won, the crowd outside would have been highly motivated to enter for the atmosphere and the trophy presentation.

The importance of the social media 'selfie' as evidence that 'you were there' cannot be underestimated, even if it is not necessarily understood by most of the older generation.

6.9.8 It is quite feasible that those so motivated, drunk and drugged, would have rushed police lines. Hundreds or perhaps thousands, may have tried to enter at the same time as those inside began to leave. Despite the desire to watch the ceremony, those inside had in many cases suffered an unpleasant arrival experience and now faced real challenges returning home with the diminishing number of trains available. The prospect of a surging, ingressing and intoxicated due to drugs and alcohol, crowd in the event of England victory at the same time as the crowd is egressing is a frightening one. Had the weather not turned wet, and had England won the game, the consequences need little imagination.

#### 6.10 Totem Collapse


6.10.1 I have already described many ways for crowds to be hurt or killed. In comparison, the possibility of structural collapse occurs quite rarely and is often overlooked. On this occasion though a specific incident needs to be mentioned on Olympic Way.

6.10.2 The 'Totem' in question had started the day as part of a 'dressed' sponsorship partial arch on West Olympic Way just south of Engineers Way. It is one of a pair and the one in question is the right of that pair viewed from the stadium. It can be seen earlier in the day here.

6.10.3 The details are spelt out in the table below. It is obvious from both the public and police attempts to lift it from its fallen position, potentially with others trapped underneath, these are substantially heavy structures. They are also inherently unstable once additional weight is added across the flat top section with perhaps 60% of the surface area unsupported by the base.



6.10.4 This particular structure might have been predicted as inviting to climb and this should have been prevented or stopped at an early stage. The fact that there were no serious injuries is surprising.



21:36:42	Totem	C179	The Totem has 15-20 people on top and falls to the left with others passing by. Those on top slide onto many others below.
21:37:05	Totem	C179	As the camera zooms, hundreds run towards the Totem and scores begin efforts to lift it, but only succeed in 'sliding' it. The efforts look frantic and give an impression people are trapped.
21:37:25	Totem	C179	Police move in and join efforts to lift the Totem, moving the crowd away.
21:38:32	Totem	C179	Stocky male in white t-shirt appears from under apex of Totem and staggers away, rubbing his head looking unsteady until supported by another man. Simultaneously a brown haired male in black t-shirt is pulled out from the south side.

## **7.0 CONCLUSION**

7.1 Listed above are a series of 'near miss' incidents which took place at Wembley that I have placed within the context of those where other large-scale crowd crush injuries, or fatalities, have occurred. It is highly likely that many more injuries occurred than were reported.

7.2 The considerations I have applied are: on balance, could have things been worse? If the circumstances had been just slightly different, had a person fallen a few seconds earlier or later, had the incident taken place a few minutes earlier or later when crowds were heavier, had the numbers been slightly greater, had police and/staff not been in the appropriate location to undertake an immediate rescue, or had they not recognised the incident as an imminent threat to life, could serious injuries or fatalities (single or multiple) have occurred?

7.3 I have reached the conclusion that based upon my interviews and viewing CCTV footage, there are more than sufficient examples of circumstances that can be classed as 'incidents that might have been worse'. In some cases, a lot worse. There were many of them, and each could have been a single or multiple fatality incident. I do not see that any single one of these incidents was of the type or nature that would have caused deaths in the hundreds, but that is not to say that in slightly differing circumstances, such an outcome would have been impossible.

7.4 The Wembley staff, safety officer, stadium director and stewards on the ground were left in an unenviable position by the behaviour of many those who attended, often without tickets. The decisions made by the safety officer for Wembley to establish 'Fortress' mode and lock the doors, whilst at other times increasing exit door strengths, were high risk and exceptionally brave. Had these decisions not been taken, it is likely that hundreds or even thousands more, would have entered the stadium with ever more dangerous scenarios unfolding inside. But had these decisions resulted in further injuries or worse outside, I have no doubt severe criticism would have been made of the decision makers. This factor must have weighed heavily on them on the night and since.

7.5 I must conclude that with the frequency of incidents occurring at so many locations, especially simultaneously, there was a significant threat to life on the day of the final and having studied the footage, I consider that those present were lucky that nothing more serious occurred. Had it been the case, the nature of this inquiry would have been quite different.

7.6 It is a sad truth that inquests and inquiries into mass fatality incidents often lead to significant changes, either in procedures or legislation, or sometimes both. It should be the case that the proximity of this incident to being one more serious should ensure that the conclusions and recommendations of this review should be treated in the same manner.



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## APPENDIX B

Incident/Suggestion	Location	Time	Source	Cameras	Camera Time	Actual Incident seen	Risk	Secondary Risk	Colour Code
Crowd Density	Olympic Way/Box Park	14:54	Disc 2:	C179 Arch Apex	15:54:00	Moderate to High density crowds on Olympic way and Eastern side making it very hard to pass through. There are pockets here where a progressive crowd collapse might have occurred.	Oppressive but not dangerous		Wedging
Barrier surged and collapse	Spanish Steps	1725	Disk 2: Stuart Doyle >Ramps >1400	C54 Pedestrian Ramp NW	17:25:30	surge of 100 towards ped at top of Spanish steps causing ped barrier collapse.	High Comp crush		Not Used
Barrier surged and collapse	Spanish Steps	1725	Disk 2: Stuart Doyle >Ramps >1400	C54 Pedestrian Ramp NW	17:25:40	17:25:40 Male in blue shirt falls and numerous fall on top. Police change from prevention to rescue. 100+ more fail to follow from stairs - close escape			Slip, trip, trample. etc
Barrier surged and collapse	Spanish Steps	17:25:36	Disk 2: Stuart Doyle >Ramps >1400	C54 Pedestrian Ramp NW	17:25:36	17:25:36 Asian males with white T short and paper crown centre of picture falls and is buried at 17:25:45 climbs free but then begins seizure and unconsciousness until 17:30:41 (five minutes)			Compression
Barrier surged and collapse	Spanish Steps	17:26:20	Disk 2: Stuart Doyle >Ramps >1400	C54 Pedestrian Ramp NW	17:26:20	17:26:20. Abandoned shoes on floor, a frequent reminder after fatal crowd crushes. Compare with 1815 if crowds had surged at this point Also indicates insufficient staff at 1815, only 65% of chutes open (eleven instead of seventeen)			Progressive Crowd Collapse
Queuing on Staircase	Spanish Steps	18:07	Disk 2: Stuart Doyle >Ramps >1400	C54 Pedestrian Ramp NW	18:07 onwards	Queues tailback to top of Spanish Steps because of restricted access to gates (65% open), pinching of queues increasing frustration and density at entry points. Filter at bottom slows ingress - good. 18:42 switch to complete wave through of fans, no checks at beginning or end of queues	High risk of staircase collapse, barrier collapse		High risk of staircase collapse, barrier collapse
Crowd Density and barrier fail?	Olympic Steps W side Grid 2:5	18:20 onwards	Disc 1: External CCTV > Transport Steps.DC1.EP1	C256ArchNE	18:20:00	Bottom left of stairs comes under pressure from west lateral squeeze. Pressure is onto side of Ped barrier - not designed. Wall climbing begins sporadically and becomes common on both sides.	Compression	Progressive Crowd Collapse	
Crowd Density and barrier fail?	Olympic Steps W side Grid 2:5	18:30	Disc 1: External CCTV > Transport Steps.DC1.EP1	C256ArchNE	18:30:00 to 18:35:00	Pressure onto stewards (and police?) becomes to great and lateral pressure pushes open lines. Simultaneously, flows increase until all lines are free flow. Crowds at high density transition form stationary to moving crowds. Density at bottom left of steps as viewed remains high until 18:44	V high risk of slip etc and trample		
Ped barriers jumped and surged	SW Ramp	18:32:24	Disk 2: Stuart Doyle >Ramps >1400	C317 SW Ramp	18:32:24	One fencer jumper distracts steward at broken barrier, as he turns, crowd push and surge through approx. 30 then pushed back by police	Low to Mod		
Pass Gate H breached	Gate H	18.46	Disc 1	C275 Internal Turnstile H Camera 2	18.46	Pass Gate H breached to far right of camera shot approx. 60 - 70 enter before control gain briefly regained (18:46:18) but then lost and another 50 enter. Staff jammed in pass gate as crowd forced back out. 18:46:42 crowd collapsed on floor in pass gate. 18:47: 05 Male then opens Gate X202 from inside and another 80 run in	High Wedge		
Exit gates forced from outside and crowd surge	Gate G exit gate x007	18:54:35	Disc 1	C273 Internal Turnstile G	18:54:35	Exit gate forced from outside, surge of XXXX collapse and trampling at 18:54:50. Female lifted and taken to left by boyfriend? at 18:54:56 after trampling. 18:55:00 X008 forced open Between 300- 400 enter.	Trampling		

Incident/Suggestion	Location	Time	Source	Cameras	Camera Time	Actual Incident seen	Risk	Secondary Risk
Exit gates forced from outside and crowd surge	Gate G exit gate x007 and 008	19:06:00 Onwards	Disc 1	C273 Internal Turnstile G Camera 1	19:06:47	Doors are pulled open from outside and crowd surges in, crowd collapse onto floor in places three to four deep.	Trampling, Crushing and Wedge	
Exit gates forced from outside and crowd surge	Gate G exit gate x007 and 008	19:06:00 Onwards	Disc 1	C273 Internal Turnstile G Camera 1	19:06:53	Second door fails	Trampling, Crushing and Wedge	
Exit gates forced from outside and crowd surge	Gate G exit gate x007 and 008	19:06:00 Onwards	Disc 1	C273 Internal Turnstile G Camera 1	19:06:55	Doors fail and female staff member (black dress) knocks head backwards on floor then stamped on	Trampling, Crushing and Wedge	
Exit gates forced from outside and crowd surge	Gate G exit gate x007 and 008	19:06:00 Onwards	Disc 1	C273 Internal Turnstile G Camera 1	19:06:56	A man carrying a small child is swept in through the right edge of the door at Grid 4:7	Trampling, Crushing and Wedge	
Exit gates forced from outside and crowd surge	Gate G exit gate x007 and 008	19:06:00 Onwards	Disc 1	C273 Internal Turnstile G Camera 1	19:07:01	He falls backwards hanging on to the child but falls over those behind him as he is pushed in backwards.	Trampling, Crushing and Wedge	
Exit gates forced from outside and crowd surge	Gate G exit gate x007 and 008	19:06:00 Onwards	Disc 1	C273 Internal Turnstile G Camera 1	19:07:03	He is helped by a member of staff back to his feet and then recovers two other small children from the middle of the melee	Trampling, Crushing and Wedge	
Exit gates forced from outside and crowd surge	Gate G exit gate x007 and 008	19:06:00 Onwards	Disc 1	C273 Internal Turnstile G Camera 1	19:07:04	Female recovered from floor by steward.	Trampling, Crushing and Wedge	
Exit gates forced from outside and crowd surge	Gate G exit gate x007 and 008	19:06:00 Onwards	Disc 1	C273 Internal Turnstile G Camera 1	19:08:05	The last people are recovered from the floor, 1 minute and twenty seconds after collapsing. There is fighting in the doorway with police and staff trying to hold the line and close the doors.	Trampling, Crushing and Wedge	
Exit gates forced from outside and crowd surge	Gate G exit gate x007 and 008	19:06:00 Onwards	Disc 1	C273 Internal Turnstile G Camera 1	19:08:52	The crowd surge again and the doors are lost, scores rush in, people fall and are trampled, slightly less serious in terms of entrapment that at 19:06:47.	Trampling, Crushing and Wedge	
Exit gates forced from outside and crowd surge	Gate G exit gate x007 and 008	19:06:00 Onwards	Disc 1	C273 Internal Turnstile G Camera 1	19:09:19	Doors are regained under police control	Trampling, Crushing and Wedge	
WhatsApp Video						WhatsApp Video of above from spectator inside.	Trampling, Crushing and Wedge	

Incident/Suggestion	Location	Time	Source	Cameras	Camera Time	Actual Incident seen	Risk	Secondary Risk	Colour Code
Pass gate D overcome and opened	Pass gate D	18:56:40	Disc 1	C72 Turnstile D entrance	Continues to 1910	15 Minutes of Pass gate door open and crowd compression with surging from the outside.	High Wedge		
Pass gate Breached	Gate D	19:02:19	Disc 1	C64	19:02:19	Pass Gate under attack for several minutes with people within gate area, then breaches internally. Around 200 enter at speed.	Slip, Trip Fall and trampling		
Pass Gate opened by man in Hi Viz	Pass gate D	19:15:04	Disc 1	C72 Turnstile D entrance	Continues to 1916	This is a coordinated attack by a group of mostly young Black men, who are then attacked by ticket holders (mostly white). It is coordinated by a man in a yellow High viz, hood and Covid facemask. A 'gang' then loiter outside for some time taking abuse from crowd.	High Wedge		
Pass gate Breached	Gate D	19:15:13	Disc 1	C64	19:15:13	19:15 breached again (See entry at 19:15:04 male with Yellow High Viz) but limited access. But, a pressure situation with metal doors being used to squeeze back crowds occurs.	High Wedge		
Gate J L1 forced and Jibbed	Gate J Level 1	19:19:59	Disk 2: Stuart Doyle >Ramps >1400	C315 NW Ramp	19:19:59	Door forced from outside, surge of 100 plug, some enter pushed back by police and stewards but compression for 1 minute 19:20:58 Door closed	Medium Comp Crush		
Wedging into Pass gate	Block J pass gate	19:21	Disk 2: Stuart Doyle >Ramps >1400	Disk 2 No C52 Ped Ramp W	19:21:37	Steward opens pass gate, surge forward from 19:21:50. Recovered by external police 19:22:15	High Wedge		
Pass Gate(or fire exit off shot) breached	Gate H	19:41	Disc 1	C275 Internal Turnstile H Camera 2		Male runs to fire doors at right side of picture, just off screen and approx. 100 - 120 run through entering.	High Wedge		
Pass gate D surged	Pass gate D	19:44:15	Disk 2: Stuart Doyle >Ramps >1400	C318 SE Ramp	19:44:15	Pass gate opened to eject? Crowd surge until 19:44:35 and gate closed, about 100 involved.	High Wedge		
	Pass gate D	19:46:00	Disk 2: Stuart Doyle >Ramps >1400	C318 SE Ramp	19:46 onwards	Repeated and sometimes successful attempts are made to this door until police intervene.	High Wedge		
Stairway Surge	Olympic Steps	19:56: Onwards	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C50 Olympic Way	19:56:28 Onwards	19:56:28 small group run off camera bottom right screen, within 15 seconds, scores are running from different directions towards a barrier breach at the bottom of the steps, 10 seconds later it is hundreds running			
Barrier breach and running crowds	Olympic Steps	19:56: Onwards	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C50 Olympic Way	19:56:28 Onwards	19:57:26, half the width is breached and the Olympic Steps have hundreds climbing them (1 minute). Many run through an ineffective police filter at the top of the steps. most police seem unaware of what is coming.			
Crowd reverses and runs to inbound crowd	Olympic Steps	19:56: Onwards	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV >	C50 Olympic Way	19:57:30	19:57:30, many who have reached the level, turn and move back (off camera police approach?)			



Incident/Suggestion	Location	Time	Source	Cameras	Camera Time	Actual Incident seen	Risk	Secondary Risk	Colour Code
Single Officer charge	Olympic Steps	19:56: Onwards	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C50 Olympic Way	19:57:37	19:57:37 one officer bottom right is pulled back into line	High risk of staircase collapse, barrier collapse		
police embedded in crowd	Olympic Steps	19:56: Onwards	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C50 Olympic Way	19:58:00	19:58 police line top of stairs, now embedded with crowd, is withdrawn.			
Police cause crowd to run	Olympic Steps	19:56: Onwards	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C50 Olympic Way	19:58:12	19:58:12, officer in red baseball cap with stick raised approaches crowd causing scores to turn and run, triggering a chain reaction in many others.			
Impact between opposing crowds	Olympic Steps	19:56: Onwards	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C50 Olympic Way	19:58:15	19:58:15 retreating crowd impact on approaching crowd causing pressure point.			
Impact between opposing crowds	Olympic Steps	19:56: Onwards	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C50 Olympic Way	19:58:26	19:58:26 one hundred or so running fans reach top of staircase whilst others are still climbing it causing significant pressure point at top of staircase.			
Secondary compression by police action	Olympic Steps	19:56: Onwards	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C50 Olympic Way	19:58:38	19:58:38 two PSUs in fast walk batons raised towards crowd cause secondary wave and significant compression at staircase top			
Police Rescue collapsed woman	Olympic Steps	19:56: Onwards	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C50 Olympic Way and C179	19:58:40	19:59:40 officers enter crowd top right of staircase to rescue female from floor.	Trampling		
Barriers and people knocked down	Olympic Steps Bottom	19:56	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C179 Arch Apex	19:56 to	Most of above in detail but also 19:56:47, as crowds surge forwards, barrier from our right are pushed in front of running crowds by others joining. To right of picture, people are knocked over by barriers and walls are climbed.	High, slip, trip, fall		
Multiple Issues as above	Olympic Steps	19:56	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C179 Arch Apex	19:56 to	19:59:22 police push has caused significant pressure points on right and left of stair cases.			
Multiple Issues as above	Olympic Steps	19:56	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C179 Arch Apex	19:56 to	19:59:20 man in blue, runs forward as others try to catch police attention to fallen female.		Significant risk of staircase	

Incident/Suggestion	Location	Time	Source	Cameras	Camera Time	Actual Incident seen	Risk	Secondary Risk	Colour Code
Multiple Issues as above	Olympic Steps	19:56	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C179 Arch Apex	19:56 to	19:59:38 police enter crowd and extract female whilst still being pushed around by crowd.	collapse and compressive injuries.		
crowd surge towards staircase, barrier collapse and trampled	Bottom Olympic Steps	19:56	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C256 Arch NE	19:56:21	Crowd Push through at screen Grid 7:3 by 19:57 this is now hundreds running towards the breach	Slip, trip, trample. etc		
crowd surge towards staircase, barrier collapse and trampled	Bottom Olympic Steps	19:57	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C256 Arch NE	19:57:30	Crowds from West along Engineers way start to grow and pressure the barriers on that corner of steps. At 19:58:15 people can be seen falling over barriers as others continue from behind. The footage of the barrier remnants can be seen at 20:04:32 as a male dances in the middle with a barrier raised.	Barrier collapse and V high risk slip, trample	Compression	
crowds running upstairs are met with those running downstairs	Mid Olympic Steps	19:58	Disk 2: Euro Final > External CCTV > Transport	C256 Arch NE	19:58:50	See Below Camera C12 and C53 for cause. The effect is crowds running upstairs are met with crowds running downstairs, compact on the middle. The shallow levels and level areas of the steps prevent anything more serious occurring but crowd compression and double direction movement with speed is extremely dangerous.	High: Compression and risk of stairway collapse		
police Baton Charge	Olympic Way top of steps	1958	Disk 2: Stuart Doyle >Ramps >1400	Disk 2 No C12	19:58:40	Police guard gates and then baton charge crowd triggering runners through crowd whilst others still approaching	High, slip, trip, fall		
police Baton Charge	Olympic Way top of steps from East	1958	Disk 2: Stuart Doyle >Ramps >1400	Disk No 2 C53 PedestRamp NE	19:58:40	Distance shot shows charge and people running towards top of Olympic Steps into crowd coming up steps.	High, slip, trip, fall		
internal vomitory possible crowd collapse	West Stand	20:02:30	Disc1:External CCTV > Upper Bowl > NE	C169 Upper Bowl NE	20:02:30	At this time, the scoring of the England Goal, there is the suggestions of a small dense crowd directly behind the England goal, the camera has come to it late so its cause is unknown. I have scanned all internal bowl footage and am surprised to not see more examples of crowd collapses on vomitories given the suggestion in some quarters that many thousands of ticketless fans entered and remained standing. This appears to not be supported by the evidence although many may have taken seats. it is also possible that many had not yet entered the seating areas. Middle and upper both look half empty although had not been sold to capacity.	Low risk of stairway collapse		
surge into Gate C	Gate C Level 1	20:03:20	Disk 2: Stuart Doyle >Ramps >1400	C56 PedStep SE	20:03:20	Attempt to Jibb at Gate C. The speed at which the message is transmitted and within ten seconds maybe 200 approach the gate before police baton chare and one male falls. All over in 20 seconds	High Wedge and Medium, slip, trip, fall		
High Temp Pyro	Bottom of Olympic Steps Centre	20:18:00	Disc 1: External CCTV > Transport Steps.DC1.EP1	C256ArchNE	20:18:54	A pyro flare (not smoke), these full flares burn at 1,000 C° to 1,600 C°, the melting point of steel. For one minutes s passed around the crowd and swung too and fro.	Slip, trip, fall		
barriers used as trampoline	Bottom of Olympic Steps West side	20:24:47	Disc 1: External CCTV > Transport Steps.DC1.EP1	C256ArchNE	20:24:47	The crowd have piled Ped barrier on top of each other and made a giant metal Trampoline. Dozens use it and a number fall over/off. 20:35 Stewards begin to dismantle it and meet no visible resistance. Some fans help them and stop others throwing barriers (one male stops another throwing barriers Slide 16). Removal complete by 20:40	High, slip, trip, fall and head injury.		

## Addendum 3: Jason Moseley report on illegal entry numbers

### **Independent CCTV Assessment Report**

### **UEFA EURO 2020 Final - Italy v England**

### **Wembley Stadium – Sunday 11 July 2021**

**Date of report:** 10 November 2021

#### **Introduction**

My name is Jason Moseley. I am a retired police officer, having recently completed 30 years service in the West Midlands Police Force.

I am a PIP2 level investigator with 20 years service as a detective, the last 11 years spent as a detective on the homicide dept. I am a Tier 5 serious and complex interview strategy adviser and a Tier 3 serious and complex interviewer in both witness and suspect arenas. I have provided interview strategy advice to senior investigation officers, and conducted serious and complex interviews of suspects and witnesses during in excess of 200 homicide investigations.

I have extensive experience of CCTV investigation, including retrieval, viewing and compiling of evidential reports in homicide cases, and I have presented my CCTV evidence in Crown Courts during homicide trials.

I am presently an Associate for MoRServ Ltd, who provide risk, intelligence and investigation services, and a director of my own investigations company, JLM Investigations Ltd.

#### **Purpose of report**

On behalf of Crest Advisory, acting as secretariat for Baroness Casey of Blackstock's independent review of disorder at the Euro 2020 final, I have been tasked with viewing CCTV footage from Wembley Stadium in relation to multiple breaches of security by ticketless persons to gain entry. My task was to provide a numerical estimate of the number of ticketless people who gained entry.

#### **Information provided**

I have been provided with the following documentation:

- Safety Officer's log [event overview]
- Safety Officer's matchday report.
- Wembley Stadium final review report
- UEFA event timeline
- Brent Council Public Safety Officer report
- Wembley Safety Officer decision log

From this I note the breaches occurred at Turnstiles B, C, D, G, H, K and M.

I have been provided with a Seagate hard drive containing CCTV footage from numerous external and internal cameras at Wembley Stadium. Which footage was viewed, and from which cameras, is outlined in the report.

I have taken the viewing parameters to be from the time the turnstiles opened to kick-off time at 20:00 unless otherwise noted in the material supplied.

I have not been provided with any information as to the accuracy of the CCTV footage time stamp so therefore any times noted are from the screen time displayed.

I will deal with each gate in turn during this report to provide details of individual breaches and then provide an accurate numerical total. Please note pictures have been pixelated for GDPR and privacy reasons.

### **Turnstile/Gate B**

#### **Internal camera C91, External camera C74**

A breach at 19:11:41 via external disabled entrance door being forced when stewards opened the door from inside to eject persons who had tailgated at the turnstile. Approximately **20** persons gained entry to the inner door but were forced back by police and stewards and did not gain entry into the inner stadium areas.









## Turnstile /Gate C

### **Internal camera C90, External camera C73**

The first breach at 18:53:56 was via an external disabled entrance door being forced. During this breach approximately **70** people, in 48 seconds, gained entry to the inner stadium areas.





The second breach at 19:10:52 was again by forcing the external disabled entrance door. During this breach approximately **20** people gained entry to the internal disabled door but they did not gain entry to the inner stadium areas because police and security staff forced them back.



### Turnstile / Gate D

#### **Internal Camera C64, External Camera C72**

The first breach at 18:47:34 was via the external disabled entrance doors being rushed by the crowd when the door was opened internally by security staff to eject people who had tailgated at the turnstiles. Approximately **20** people gained entry to the inner disabled entrance door, but they did not gain entry to the inner stadium areas because security staff forced them back.





The second breach at 18:56:48 was also via the external disabled entrance doors being rushed by the crowd when the door was opened internally by security staff to eject people who had tailgated at the turnstiles. Approximately **20** people gained entry to the inner disabled entrance door but they did not gain entry to the inner stadium areas because security staff forced them back.



The third breach at 19:00:14 hours was also via external disabled entrance doors being rushed by crowd when the door was opened internally by security staff to eject people who had tailgated at the turnstiles. Approximately **130** people gained entry to the inner disabled entrance door. They gained to the inner stadium area in approximately 40 seconds because security staff were unable to force them back.





There were then three further breaches of the external disabled entrance door being rushed by crowd when the door was opened internally by security staff to eject people who had tailgated at the turnstiles. These were at 19:15:10, 19:44:21 and 19:46:58 hours. Approximately **60** people in total gained entry to the inner disabled entrance door but they did not gain entry to the inner stadium areas because police and security staff forced them back.











## Turnstile/Gate G

### **Internal cameras C272 and 273, External camera C69**

The first breach, at 18:54:37 hours, was via fire doors being forced from the outside. During this breach approximately **350** people gained entry into the stadium in approximately 2 minutes and were able to get into the inner areas of the stadium.

The first clip shows the moment the door was forced. The broken security bar clearly displays the level of force used to gain entry.





The next image shows people being forced to the floor and trampled over by the crowds forcing their way in from behind.







The next image shows a clearly distressed female being consoled by a male. This female had been trampled in the breach and was rescued by the male.



The next image shows a male in a wheelchair being helped into the stadium by security staff through the disabled entrance, whilst other security staff were trying to force people back out of the disabled entrance.





The second breach at this turnstile was again by forcing the fire doors from outside. This breach came in two waves at 19:06:50 and 19:08:50 hours.

During these 2 minutes approximately **250** people gained entry into the inner areas of the stadium.

#### **First wave**

The first image shows members of security, other staff and members of the public attempting to hold the fire doors to prevent a further breach.







The next image again clearly shows the level of violence used to gain entry, as people are once more forced to the floor and trampled underfoot by the crowd behind.





**Second wave**







Due to the damage caused during these breaches a heavy-duty mobile fork lift truck was brought in and placed in order to try to stop any further breaches.







A third breach occurred at 22:49:13, during the penalty shootout, when approximately **30** people gained entry into the inner stadium areas by forcing an unmanned external fire door.





## Turnstile/Gate H

### **Internal Camera C274 and C275, External Camera C83**

The first breach, at 18:45:57, was via an internal disabled entrance door being forced from outside. During this breach approximately **200** people gained entry into the inner stadium areas in around 90 seconds.



During this breach, people can clearly be seen being forced to the floor and trampled underfoot by the crowds behind. In the next image a young child can be clearly seen going to the floor.








The second breach, at 18:47:06, whilst the first breach was still ongoing, was via a fire exit door opened from inside by a member of the public, in a deliberate act to allow access to those outside. During this breach approximately **90** people gained access into the inner stadium areas in around 90 seconds.

The first image shows the perpetrator entering the stadium by apparent lawful means.



He enters the stadium with another male, then turns round and runs for the secured fire doors, which he opens from inside by operating the emergency exit security bar, allowing access to others outside.


















The third breach, at 19:41:20, was via a fire exit door being opened from inside by a member of the public in another deliberate act to allow access to those outside. During this breach approximately **100** people gained access into the inner stadium areas in around 30 seconds.



A male runs for the secured fire doors from within the stadium, which he opens from inside by operating the emergency exit security bar, allowing access to others outside.







Again, during this breach people can be seen being forced to the floor and trampled underfoot by the force of the crowd entering from behind.





External view of third breach



### Turnstile / Gate K

#### **External camera C81 [no internal camera footage supplied]**

A breach at 18:34:06 via an external disabled entrance door being rushed by the crowd when the door was opened internally by security staff to eject persons who had tailgated at the turnstiles. Approximately **70** people in total gained entry to the inner disabled entrance area. I am unable to



comment on whether further access to the inner stadium areas was gained as I can find no internal camera footage for Turnstile/Gate K.



### Turnstile/Gate M

**Internal Camera C95, External camera C79 [roving camera]**

From the footage available it appears Turnstile M remains closed with no access to the Stadium.

There is a minor breach of an external disabled door at 18:29:58 where approximately **10** people gain entry to an inner door but this breach is foiled by security staff and no entry into the Stadium itself is gained.



There is no external footage of this breach as Camera 79 was being operated on a different location at this time.

### **Observations**

During 30 years of police service, I have been involved in the policing operation of numerous incidents of public disorder including major riots and major sporting events.

Having viewed this CCTV footage in great detail I have the following observations to make:

The levels of violence and force used by people gaining unlawful entry were extremely high and would have caused any person of reasonable firmness present at the event to fear for their personal safety.

I have been asked to comment on any use of items or tools such as crowbars being used to force fire doors at Gate G. On the footage I have viewed I can see no use of any such item. However, due to the numbers present, the external view is obscured and is not close enough to see how entry was physically forced. But since it was a secured fire door, with no external handles or means of forcing the door, I cannot exclude the possibility or indeed likelihood that a tool of some design was used.

I have noted security staff within the inner turnstile areas eject in excess of **400** people who had gained entry by tailgating or rushing the turnstile in sporadic and individual incidents of between **50** and **150** people per turnstile viewed.



In my opinion these individual and sporadic breaches were dealt with by the security staff in a timely and well-controlled manner, despite the levels of violence which were displayed on occasions.

I have noted that many of the breaches and attempted breaches were by people outside forcing a door that had been opened internally by security staff, either to allow disabled or otherwise impaired persons to enter safely, or to eject tailgaters or others who had gained unlawful entry to the stadium. This quickly became a widespread tactic across nearly all turnstile areas. This clearly caused distress and alarm to a number of disabled or otherwise impaired attendees.

In my opinion there was a lack of security staff and/or police in the immediate area outside the turnstiles who could perform control at the turnstiles. There was also a lack of a coordinated response between staff inside and outside the turnstiles to deter the sporadic attempts at tailgating and assist in ejecting people via disabled entrances by protecting the area in those instances.

As outlined in the above report, a number of “crush” incidents were noted where, in the attempts to force entry, people were forced to the ground and then trampled underfoot by the force of the crowd behind. It is surprising that significant instances of serious harm or injury did not occur during these mass breaches. To highlight this I refer you to the image above [page 19] of the young child who was trampled on at Gate H.

I have also noted that large groups of people were going from turnstile to turnstile attempting to gain entry in mass numbers. They only left one turnstile when efforts were thwarted and then moved quickly on to another nearby turnstile. These actions are difficult to capture on still images due to the numbers involved, but are apparent on moving footage.

### **Conclusion**

- Further to the 17 major breaches detailed above, whilst viewing the footage from the turnstiles outlined above, I noted approximately **430** sporadic and individual breaches of the turnstiles by ticketless people tailgating or rushing turnstiles
- These breaches were in the main, dealt with by security staff and the majority of people were ejected
- For completeness however I have included this number in my final estimation of **1870** ticketless people gaining entry to some extent into Wembley Stadium at this event
- Allowing a +/- of 5% gives a low total of **1776** and a higher total of **1964**
- With regard to an estimate of ticketless people that actually gained entry into the inner areas of Wembley Stadium, taking into account the numbers presented above and based upon my viewing of the available and pertinent footage I estimate approximately **1320** ticketless people gained access to the inner areas of Wembley Stadium
- Allowing a +/- of 5% gives a low total of **1254** and a higher total of **1386**

### **Key points**

Having viewed the CCTV provided I have identified the following key points based upon my experience, and the remit of the report:

1. There was a timely response from internal security as people unlawfully breached the turnstiles (by ‘tailgating’)
2. Ejecting people who had entered illegally through a disabled entrance caused a secondary problem, as people outside saw this as an opportunity to force entry. This issue was widespread

3. Staffing at the fire doors and other internal doors was not consistent, which provided opportunities for ticketless people to enter unlawfully, through other people forcing the doors or opening them from the inside

Jason Moseley

MoRServ Ltd. / JLM Investigations Ltd.



## **Expert Opinion**

### **Provided for Baroness Casey of Blackstock's Independent Review of the Euro 2020 Final for the Football Association**

**Professor Geoff Pearson Ph.D(Law), LL.B(Hons.)**

**The University of Manchester Law School**

#### **Remit and Basis of Opinion**

This interim opinion responds to the following questions put to me by the Baroness Casey Independent Review for the Football Association:

- (1) *“The foreseeability or otherwise of England fans travelling to Wembley without tickets ahead of the Euro 2020 Final”.*
- (2) *“The foreseeability or otherwise of attempts by ticketless England fans to enter Wembley Stadium on the day of the Euro 2020 Final.”*
- (3) *“The foreseeability or otherwise of disorder among England fan outside Wembley Stadium ahead of, during and after the Euro 2020 Final”.*
- (4) *“What if any measures could have prevented disorder among England fans outside Wembley Stadium ahead of, during and after the Euro 2020 Final”.*

The following opinion is drawn from primary academic research on football fan behaviour and football crowd management and policing 1995-present, a review of academic evidence on football crowd behaviour, crowd management and policing, information on behavioural issues relating to Covid-19 and lockdown regulations, and evidence provided to me by the Casey Review team.

### *Question 1:*

*How foreseeable or otherwise was it that England fans would travel to Wembley without tickets ahead of the Euro 2020 Final?*

#### **1.1 Football as Carnival and Transgression**

It is well established that for many football fans, watching the match in the stadium is only one important aspect of a match event. The collective expression of identity is a fundamental feature of the experience for a large subculture of fans who tend to dominate the travelling support of English clubs and the national team. This collective expression of identity is not limited to the stadium itself and fans will seek to gather in large groups, particularly pre-match, usually in large pubs or outdoor spaces, in order to chant, display colours, and engage in social consumption of alcohol. Fans adhering to these norms have been labelled “carnival” fans, as the experience sought by the fans is primarily one of transgression from everyday norms.

For important matches, fans tend to demonstrate an increased desire to engage in transgressive collective displays of identity, but at the same time have access to fewer tickets for the event. This means more ticketless fans will gather. England matches away from home and in international tournaments are known for attracting large numbers of ticketless fans who want to take part in the “carnival” around the match. For example, around 25,000 ticketless fans travelled to Marseilles for the 1998 World Cup match between England and Tunisia, 40,000 for the Euro2004 England v Portugal Quarter-Final in Lisbon, and as many as 60,000 for the England v Paraguay World Cup match in Frankfurt in 2006. None of these matches were reported as having large scale attempts at ‘jibbing’, and all had popular and well-advertised “fan zones” screening the match.

Similarly, in 2008 Glasgow Rangers (whose dominant norms of travelling fan behaviour are comparable to England’s) played Zenit St Petersburg in the UEFA Cup Final in Manchester and an estimated 150,000 Rangers fans travelled to Manchester for the day of the match, of which only around 37,000 obtained tickets. The authorities in Manchester put on mass screening events for Rangers fans and the stadium never became a magnet for large numbers of ticketless fans, although large-scale disorder did occur in the city centre.

Large gatherings of ticketless fans for a match of the magnitude of the Euro2020 Final, which was more significant than any of the afore-mentioned matches, were therefore inevitable. However, such ticketless gatherings do not mean that a “mass jib” or major crowd disorder is either inevitable or likely.



## **1.2 The Lack of Attractive Spaces to Gather**

Matches at international tournaments, attract large numbers of ticketless fans, and very few national teams can boast numbers of travelling fans to match the England team. Since the 1990s, tournament organisers have increasingly looked to host “fan zones” to cater for the many ticketless fans (and enthusiastic locals), with bar facilities, food, toilets, and a large screen. Indeed, such has been the success of these zones that they have become an important source of income for event organisers.

There are many fans who will not attend official fan zones due to their corporate nature, expensive alcohol, bar queues, and high-level of restrictions upon behaviour. Subsequently, many England fans also seek out alternative spaces in which to gather to engage in carnivalesque activity (usually city centre squares) and to watch the match (local bars). However, experience shows us that official fan zones do draw large numbers of ticketless English fans to them, despite the reservations about such spaces.

Had such spaces been available in London, and in particular around Wembley stadium, it is highly likely that large numbers of ticketless fans who wished to engage in carnivalesque activity and watch the match would have attended these events. This would not have prevented those who were intending to “jib” from travelling to Wembley, those seeking tickets from touts, or those who wanted to be as close to the event as possible. But alternative spaces would have attracted some ticketless fans early on in the day and drawn a significant proportion of the ticketless fans away from the stadium as kick-off approached. This would have significantly reduced the number of fans in proximity to the stadium and reduced both the size of the crowd and the number of fans who spontaneously decided to try and gain access to the stadium when they saw an opportunity to do so.

In the absence of large screens, and with much pub access restricted across London due to closures and reductions in capacities, Wembley Way, and the new spaces such as Wembley Plaza, were likely to become a magnet for ticketless fans to engage in carnivalesque and transgressive group behaviour. The pre-match gathering of fans at Wembley Plaza for some of the earlier matches in the tournament would also have become known widely through media and social media reporting, and many of those who attended these spaces for the earlier matches would have returned. It has been reported that Wembley Plaza is particularly attractive for carnivalesque activity due to the “amplification” of sound from the surrounding buildings which make chants sound more impressive. The numbers gathering at Wembley Plaza and around were always likely to dwarf the previous gatherings before the matches against Germany and Denmark.

Most of the fans gathered in these spaces before the Final would have had no intention of “jibbing” into the ground or engaging in disorder, but their presence made management of the

crowd, and the identification of individuals with the intention of gaining unauthorised access to the stadium, more difficult. Further, as kick-off approached and the opportunity to watch the match on television diminished as bars filled up or closed, large numbers of ticketless fans near Wembley were left in a position where they may have felt their only realistic opportunity to watch a large proportion of the match was by gaining access to the stadium.

### **1.3 Covid-19 Lockdown**

Due to the lack of recent historical comparisons, it is difficult to be sure to what extent the Covid-19 lockdowns and concurrent behind-closed-doors matches had upon numbers of ticketless fans travelling to London and Wembley for the Final. Some fans would certainly have chosen not to travel due to the risk of infection or breach of Covid lockdown regulations. However, as the initial “stay at home” Covid-19 lockdown restriction started to be relaxed, it appears that individuals were more willing to gather in large groups, particularly to participate in protest-related gatherings, such as the Black Lives Matter protests (and counter-protests), anti-lockdown protests, and the Sarah Everard vigil and subsequent protests. Many BLM protests took place the weekend prior to the lockdown relaxation (although after the Government replaced the “Stay at Home” messaging), indicating a likelihood that many individuals would start amending their behaviour ahead of impending relaxations (including the “Freedom Day” due after the Euro 2020 Final).

It was also clear that football fans were willing to gather in groups when all but the strongest lockdown restrictions were in place, in order to celebrate significant achievements. The following took place following the relaxation of the 2020 “Stay at Home” lockdown, but while restrictions on gatherings and requirements for social distancing were in place:

- 9 June 2020: Following their promotion to the Championship for the first time in 18 years, around 300 Coventry City fans celebrated in Broadgate Square.
- 25-26 June 2020: Over 2,000 Liverpool fans gathered outside Anfield and then the day later at Pier Head to celebrate their first top-flight title in 30 years.
- 17 July 2020: Hundreds of Leeds United fans gathered outside Elland Road stadium to celebrate promotion to the Premier League after 16 years.

There were further large gatherings of football fans to protest against the “European Super League” proposals, again potentially contravening coronavirus regulations and guidance in April 2021, with large gatherings outside Stamford Bridge (Chelsea), The Emirates Stadium (Arsenal), and Old Trafford (Manchester United). The latter protest at its peak involved around 4,000 fans in two separate locations and resulted in the match being abandoned.

Notably all the above gatherings resulted in some level of disorder, with quite serious disorder and violence occurring in the Liverpool and Manchester United gatherings.



It was therefore clear that the relatively low-level Covid-19 restrictions in place at the time of the Euro2020 Final were not going to prevent large gatherings of celebrating supporters in London or the engagement in transgressive behaviour. Conversely, it is possible that the relative lack of opportunity to engage in carnivalesque gatherings as a result of the lockdown regulations would have made gathering before the Euro 2020 Final more appealing and increased the number of fans who attended.

#### **1.4 Kick-Off Time and Day**

The Euro2020 Final kicked off at 20.00 on a Sunday. The fact that this match took place on a weekend evening meant that it was feasible for more fans to both attend, and become intoxicated over the day, than if this match taken place on a weekday evening. Had the match been a weekday evening, many fans would have taken the day off work, and large gatherings would have still occurred, but it is likely these crowds would have been smaller and less intoxicated overall. The only timing likely to see greater crowd numbers and higher levels of intoxication pre-match would have been an evening kick-off on a Saturday.

However, when considering event days and kick-off times, we also need to take into account risks away from the stadium. An earlier kick-off during the weekend would have seen smaller gatherings outside Wembley and lower levels of pre-match intoxication, but would have likely seen earlier starts for some fans, and a continuation of drinking and transgressive behaviour afterwards, not just in London but across the country. It is likely that we would have seen more incidents of disorder in other towns and cities, and also greater levels of reported domestic abuse.

#### **1.5 Conclusion**

*How foreseeable or otherwise was it that England fans would travel to Wembley without tickets ahead of the Euro 2020 Final?*

- It was a certainty that thousands of ticketless fans would travel to London for the Final or leave their residences to attend public spaces in the city, and likely that the numbers would be in the tens of thousands.
- It was a certainty that hundreds of fans without tickets would travel to the environs of Wembley stadium ahead of the match.
- Given the absence of alternative large gathering spaces and the attractiveness of new spaces near to the stadium, it was highly likely that large numbers of ticketless fans would travel to the environs of Wembley stadium ahead of the Final. An expectation of around 10,000 would have been reasonable given the magnitude of the game and the absence of alternative foci for gathering. The estimation of 25,000 ticketless fans in Wembley environs is significantly more than I would have expected.

## *Question 2:*

*The foreseeability or otherwise of attempts by ticketless England fans to enter Wembley Stadium on the day of the Euro 2020 Final*

### **2.1 Previous Experience: Club Matches in the UK**

Routine club or international matches do not typically draw many ticketless fans, with the exception of elite Premier League clubs where home match tickets are scarce and irregular fans (particularly those travelling from abroad) attend with the intention of securing tickets from touts. However, where tickets are scarce for domestic away matches, it is more common for fans to travel without tickets, either in the hope of picking up “spares” nearer kick off, to simply enjoy the journey and pre-match atmosphere with fellow fans, or, more rarely, to see if they can enter the stadium without paying (“jibbing”). At these matches “jibbing” is rare, but for certain clubs it is accepted practice amongst regular away match-goers, and some ticket-holders allow or even encourage “jibbers” to tailgate them through the turnstiles. The established place of “jibbing” (relating not only to free entrance to the stadium) in accepted fan behaviour at some clubs is illustrated by the self-naming in the 1980s of a “firm” of Manchester United fans as the “Inter City Jibbers”, with the moto “to pay is to fail”. Away matches are preferred to home matches by “jibbers”, one reason being that fans are more likely to stand, meaning that their lack of a seat is less likely to be noticed by stewards.

The likelihood of fans travelling to domestic matches without tickets dramatically increases where the match is question is a significant one (e.g. a very irregular “derby”, the chance to win a trophy, or to gain promotion). Here fans are much more likely to travel without tickets because tickets will be more scarce and fans are more likely to want to be part of both the historical significance of the match and the likely collective carnivalesque activity that will surround a victory. Fans are also more likely to risk being caught attempting to “jib” at a more significant match, are likely to see more opportunities to “jib” due to the larger number of ticketless fans, and may be more intoxicated than at less-significant matches.

For example, attempts to violently obtain ticketless access into Stamford Bridge for a match during Dynamo Moscow’s tour of England immediately after the Second World War (arguably the closest precedent in terms of fan experience to the end of the Covid-19 lockdown), led to a successful High Court claim under the Riot (Damages) Act 1886. More recently, when Manchester United won the 2008 Premier League at the final match of the season at Wigan Athletic, hundreds of fans travelled and watched the match in a nearby pub. When victory was assured and home fans started to leave, between 100 and 500 gained access to the stadium through open exit gates.

## 2.2 Previous Experience: England Tournaments Abroad

Some England fans have successfully gained access to stadia abroad for England matches without tickets, or have been able to gain access without having their tickets checked. However, despite the fact that very large numbers of ticketless England fans travel to international tournaments held in Western Europe (see 1.1 above), achieve high levels of intoxication and engage in transgressive behaviour, very few attempt to enter stadia without tickets and we have yet to see the scale of mass “jibbing” that we saw at the Euro2020 Final.

## 2.3 Previous Experience: Wembley

I am not aware of large numbers of England fans “jibbing” matches at Wembley, or of a reputation or “culture” for this around England home matches. However, I would expect that given ticket pricing and the regularity of sell-outs, attempts are made regularly, by subterfuge, by a small number of individuals. I am not aware of any reports of significant numbers of ticketless fans seeking to gain entry without tickets for England matches for the 1966 World Cup or Euro96 matches at Wembley. For Euro96, it was reported that large numbers of ticketless Scotland fans travelled to London ahead of their match with England and watched the match in local pubs, and police were called to disperse a crowd of around 1,000 England fans who had queued through the night attempting to buy semi-final tickets at the Wembley box office two days before the match. On the day of the semi-final itself (a Wednesday), the Evening Standard reported “a security blanket of more than 1,000 (police) officers around the stadium”, although these appear to have been deployed to prevent violence caused by English club ‘firms’. *The Sun* newspaper also ran an article explaining different ways to gain access to Wembley without a ticket for the semi-final, but this was purely tongue-in-cheek.

However, for higher-profile *club* matches at Wembley, there have been widely-reported instances of large-scale “jibs”, indicating not only the enduring nature of the problem but also the place of “jibbing” in the fan folklore of Wembley. The first ever FA Cup Final at Wembley, in 1923, saw as many 175,000 fans gain access to the stadium without tickets or payment at the turnstiles. The subsequent overcrowding on the terraces led to tens of thousands of fans spilling onto the pitch and track around it and famous scenes of a police officer on a white horse helping to clear the pitch to allow the match to take place. This disorder led to the Shortt Report 1924, which recommended all-ticket matches, upgrading of turnstiles, and an increased number of gates and fences. The “White Horse Final” as it has become known, is commemorated in the naming of the White Horse Bridge and also the White Horse pub, which ironically became a foci for one of the problematic gatherings before the Euro2020 Final.

It is likely that there are other examples of large-scale “jibbing” or “bunking” at major Wembley finals, but probably the highest-profile post-1923 example is the 1986 FA Cup Final between Liverpool and Everton, where match build-up and news footage showed fans climbing



into a window on the twin towers while a larger group of fans rushed and climbed over the gates below. The 1986 Wembley “bunk” has gained iconic status in the fan culture of both Merseyside clubs. The idea that the redevelopment of Wembley would end the feasibility of “jibbing” a final was quickly challenged. In 2007, a small number of Manchester United fans were able to “tailgate” through the turnstiles ahead of the FA Cup final against Chelsea, and a search of social media reveals similar stories relating to ticketless fans of other clubs gaining access to “new” Wembley (including Chelsea and Everton) by subterfuge. At the 2011 Champions League final, ticketless Manchester United fans were able to gain access to the stadium in larger numbers, through a combination of tailgating, rushing disabled access gates, and climbing through an access tunnel before dropping through the false ceiling above the inner concourse.

In certain match-going circles, Wembley has gained a reputation as being an “easy jib”, meaning that in contrast to other stadiums it is seen as easier to gain access to. Fans have identified certain “weak points” at the redeveloped Wembley, including the lack of a strong external perimeter and sterile zone around the gates and turnstiles, the number of corporate and disabled gates, the rails outside turnstiles that make it more difficult to expel tailgaters before they get through the turnstile, and the wide spaces after the turnstile which provide an opportunity for identified tailgaters to escape security personnel. Whether these weak points are significantly greater than at other stadia is beyond the scope of this report, but the point is that this reputation is established, meaning that some fans may be more inclined to attempt to gain access to Wembley without a ticket.

Given the demand and supply challenges, and the importance of many Wembley matches, this also means that more fans are likely to attempt to gain ticketless access. Further, many of those who are successful will report back to their fan communities of their success, given the kudos they are likely to receive from their peers. Finally, fans who fail to gain access without tickets are less likely to report back than those who are successful, in turn fuelling the reputation of Wembley.

## **2.4 Historical Significance of the Match**

As the first major final that England had qualified for since 1966, and depending on your outlook, the Euro2020 final may be a once-in-a-generation opportunity for fans to witness England in a major tournament, or possibly even once-in-a-lifetime. As established above, where matches have great historical significance, this increases the likelihood of ticketless fans willing to take the risk of “jibbing”, and also, due to the increased gap in demand and supply resulting from the popularity of such matches, increases the overall number of ticketless fans who may consider it. It was inevitable that a significant number of ticketless fans would attempt to gain access due to this combination of factors alone, even before we consider other issues. As established in Section 1, it was inevitable that many thousands of ticketless fans, both locals

and from outside London, would gather in London in order to engage in carnivalesque expression and be close to the monumental event. It was also inevitable that hundreds of these would travel to the environs of the stadium in order to attempt to purchase touted tickets.

## **2.5 The Limited Capacity**

It is highly likely that the fact that Wembley was not sold-out to its capacity would have also encouraged some fans to attempt to gain access to the stadium without tickets. This fact was well-advertised in the media and ticketless fans would have been aware well in advance of the number of seats that would be unused for the final. For many potential “jibbers”, if not the majority, this would encourage them because it meant that if they were able to escape the inner concourse into the stands, the chance of them being reported or identified as ticketless due to not having an identifiable seat would be greatly reduced.

For some of those who gained or attempted to gain access, there would also have been a secondary consideration, which was that they would not be depriving a ticket-holding fan of their right to see the match. In this way, some fans were likely to have justified “jibbing” as a “victim-less” crime, and some may have gone as far as to have claimed this was a legitimate action in the fight against the commercialisation of the game and the way in which ticket prices are perceived to be taking the game away from its traditional fanbase (see the “against modern football” movement).

## **2.6 Fan Intention, “Jibbing” Opportunity, and lack of Television Access**

It should be noted that while there were clearly many fans who travelled with the intention to “jib” the Final, many of those who ended up doing so would not have travelled with this intention, but would instead have become more aware of the potential opportunities the longer they remained in the crowd outside Wembley and the closer it came to kick-off (with a receding opportunity for watching the game on television). Many of these fans would also have become more inclined to take the risk due to the inhibition-reducing effects of alcohol (and in some cases cocaine).

Some of the fans who broke through the outer perimeter may still have had no intention of “jibbing”, but instead wanted to watch what was occurring and may have only made a split-second decision to take the advantage of an opportunity such as an open gate. One of the features of the carnival fan subculture is an interest in watching and witnessing disorder even on the part of those who have no interest in engaging in it, and this has most likely been exacerbated by the social media opportunities connected with obtaining clear footage of football disorder. It is also likely that some of those pictured entering through forced gates were ticket holders who had not been able to enter through their turnstile or who had not been able to activate their tickets.

The vast majority of fans who attended the gatherings outside Wembley probably had no intention of “jibbing”, but as the kick-off approached and it became clear that it would be impossible to watch the match on television (or even on their phones due to the reported reception problems), some of these would have started to look for opportunities to gain access to the stadium. Many of these may have been influenced by intoxication and/or encouraged by stories of earlier successful “jibs”. It is noticeable that two of the major surges through the outer security cordon, at the foot of the Olympic Steps, appear to have coincided with the playing of the national anthems, which would have been audible from outside the stadium. Another rush took place following the England goal. Both these testify to the spontaneous rather than pre-planned nature of many of the attempts to gain access to the stadium. However, it appears that once the game kicked off, opportunities for watching the match on television disappeared, and news of successful “jibs” reached them, the crowd became predominantly made up of those who now had an intention to break into the stadium.

## **2.7 Conclusions**

*The foreseeability or otherwise of attempts by ticketless England fans to enter Wembley Stadium on the day of the Euro 2020 Final:*

It has been said that the Euro2020 Final was “the perfect storm”. I have sympathies for this position, as the risk factors for crowd disorder and mass “jibbing” aligned in a way that was previously unprecedented. My estimate at the time of the number of fans who gained unauthorised access to Wembley was around 2,000. The Review team’s calculation of 1,700 (of whom around 350 were ejected) therefore sounds highly plausible. Although a handful of this number would have probably been repeaters (having been previously ejected), and legitimate ticket holders, this would still make the Euro 2020 Final almost certainly the biggest Wembley “jib” since 1923, and unpredictable in terms of scale.

Nevertheless, the risk factors were all known in advance. It was incontrovertible that large numbers of fans were going to descend on London for the Final, and in the absence of attractive locations to celebrate, and as the evening wore on even watch on television, England’s first significant final since 1966, Wembley stadium was always going to be a magnet for many of those fans. The only uncertain factor was whether this would be thousands or tens of thousands of fans.

The absence of a large, attractive, and well-advertised public space to gather, drink, and watch the match certainly increased the number of ticketless fans in the vicinity of the stadium. Many of these attended Wembley Plaza and other gathering points around Wembley Stadium without an intention of trying to “jib” the match, and indeed it appears that many fans left the stadium environs to find somewhere to watch the match. However, as the kick-off approached, and pubs



in the area started closing their doors, or even shutting, these fans were left with no opportunity to watch the match. This empowered those who had travelled to the venue with the intention of “jibbing” and led to increased pressure being placed upon those tasked with managing safe and lawful entry to the stadium. As more successful “jibs” were reported, more of these otherwise directionless fans will have felt encouraged to make an attempt themselves.

- It was a certainty that ticketless fans, probably in the low 100s, would seek to gain access to Wembley stadium by subterfuge, predominantly through tailgating, photographing legitimate digital tickets, or looking to bribe stewards.
- It was probable that there would be a “jib” on a scale similar to the 2011 Champions League Final involving 100s of fans, with consistent, determined, and multiple attempts, some involving aggression.
- It was not inevitable that there would be attempts at a “mass jib” on the scale seen simply because there were thousands of intoxicated ticketless fans around Wembley in the build-up to the match.
- Once it was clear that significant numbers of fans had been successful in breaching security, and there were still thousands of fans gathered in Wembley with nowhere to watch the match, it became highly likely that there would be further persistent and aggressive attempts by large numbers of those fans.

### *Question 3:*

#### *The foreseeability or otherwise of disorder among England fan outside Wembley Stadium ahead of, during and after the Euro 2020 Final*

### **3.1 The Likelihood of Football Gatherings Becoming Disorderly**

Large crowd gatherings, be they related to protest, religious expression, festivals, or sports events, always possess some potential for disorder. The risk of disorder related to any gathering is shaped by many factors, including defeated expectations, congestion, policing responses seen as illegitimate, confrontation by rival groups, and the social expectations of disorder by crowd members. Consumption of alcohol and inhibition-lowering drugs can also have an influence on some crowd members being more likely to act in an anti-social, disorderly or violent manner, although levels of alcohol consumption have always been a poor determiner of whether a football crowd will become disorderly.

Football crowds have long been identified as a type of gathering that has the potential to engage in disorder. Football-related arrests and banning orders have been steadily reducing over the last 10 years, and arrests have dramatically reduced from their high point in the mid-late 1980s.

Although there has been some talk of a “resurgence” of football related disorder post Covid-19 lockdown, I have yet to see any evidence that there is a national trend in this direction. Nevertheless, football crowds retain the potential for disorder, particularly due to the dangers of aggressive interaction with rival fan groups and arguably the fact that football crowds retain some social expectation of possible disorder, with aggressive (but usually not physically violent) behaviour often tolerated in transgressive football crowds. The transgressive nature of football crowds, related to high levels of intoxication, displays of colour (e.g. banners and pyrotechnics), collective chanting, and ‘tomfoolery’, also often brings crowd members into conflict with each other or with those charged with managing the crowd and maintaining order. Policing of football crowds is therefore a highly specialised area, and successful football crowd management is not possible without some acceptance that normal standards of behaviour will be reduced in such a crowd, with tolerance limits for anti-social behaviour needing to be placed higher than in many other contexts.

### **3.2 The Likelihood of England Football Gatherings Becoming Disorderly**

Crowds following the England national team have a reputation for being large, intoxicated, and boisterous. However, it is exceptionally rare for England fans to travel to matches with the intention of confronting rival supporters, although rival supporter groups do on occasion seek to confront England fans (as we saw at Euro2016 in Marseille).

Abroad, England fans have been involved in several incidents of widespread and sustained disorder, particularly when the national team appears in international tournaments. This disorder is typically related to either confrontation with police or with rival fans or local gangs who have sought to confront them. This disorder usually takes the form of beer throwing, bottle throwing and occasionally the throwing of plastic chairs and tables. Some supporters may be involved in physical interpersonal violence, but the vast majority will merely engage in verbal aggression and gesticulation.

Notable incidents of such disorder in the last 25 years include:

- Marseille, England v Tunisia, World Cup, June 1998
- Charleroi, England v Germany, Euros, June 2000
- Albufeira, England v France and England v Portugal, Euros, June 2004.
- Cologne, England v Sweden, World Cup, June 2006
- Stuttgart, England v Ecuador, World Cup, June 2006
- Marseille, England v Russia, Euros, June 2016
- Porto, England v Netherlands, Nations League, June 2019

It is important to note that large-scale incidents of disorder only occur at a minority of matches, and at international tournaments it is largely the same fans making up the crowds at both disorderly and peaceful events. Evidence gathered from international matches abroad involving

the England team shows that large scale disorder is not the result of “hooligans” with a violent disposition. Neither is there any apparent connection between the result of an England match and whether disorder will occur; with the exception of Albufeira, the disorderly events listed above all occurred prior to matches, and eliminations at tournaments are rarely followed by mass disorder. Moreover, highly intoxicated crowds of ticketless England fans do not usually engage in disorder and there are policing strategies and tactics that can significantly reduce the risk of such a crowd becoming disorderly (see Section 4, below).

When England play at home, there have been occasional incidents of disorder and violence where “risk” fans from different clubs will look to confront each other. This was a particularly notable phenomenon when Wembley was being reconstructed and the England team played at different stadia around the country. It has been less of a feature of England’s support at the new Wembley and England supporters are, perhaps surprisingly, very cohesive in their support of the national team.

Finally, it should be noted that the success of the England national team in international tournaments has long been associated with large gatherings, anti-social behaviour, vandalism and disorder, in town and city centres across the country. There are reports of riots, crowd disorder, and attacks on foreign vehicles, places of work, and individuals related to the England team progressing to, and being defeated in, the semi-finals at Italia 90, Euro 96, and Russia 2018. Disorderly conduct has been associated with important victories as well as defeats (e.g. following the defeat of Colombia in the 2018 World Cup Round of 16).

In summary, disorder and anti-social behaviour of the type seen around Wembley on the day of the Euro2020 Final is a recurring feature when the England national team play in international tournaments and almost always occurs away from the confines of the stadium. However, while transgressive behaviour, anti-social behaviour, and high levels of intoxication are common features of England crowd gatherings, the vast majority of matches at international tournaments involving the England national team do not result in large-scale disorder or violence despite the presence of ticketless fans, high levels of intoxication, and significant defeats on the pitch. When England play abroad, levels of reported numbers of travelling “risk” supporters, appear to be incidental to whether large-scale disorder will occur.

### **3.3 The Intelligence Picture**

I have not to date seen any intelligence report from the Metropolitan Police or any other force, but feedback from MPS given to the review team suggests that the likelihood of pre-planned serious disorder around the Euro2020 Final was very low, while the likelihood of spontaneous serious disorder and other transgressive behaviour was very high. This reflects what I would have expected and what transpired. From the evidence I have been provided, the intelligence



picture about *where* likely disorder would occur is less clear, which may have hampered the operation.

I have been informed that the view of officers interviewed is that those involved in disorder were typically not “risk fans” (i.e. already identified by football policing officers as posing a risk of engagement in violence or disorder based on previous behaviour), but young men who had travelled to the capital and had begun drinking early in the day. This matches the profile of suspects involved in previous incidents of serious disorder involving England fans abroad, hardly any of whom are previously known to the police. The fan survey conducted by the Review team also indicates that a significant proportion of fans gathering around Wembley were openly consuming cocaine, again from early on in the day.

Given the current evidence about the causes of most football-related disorder, and the history of how disorder around England matches occurs, the lack of intelligence of the presence of “risk” supporters, or of pre-planned disorder or violence, should not have been an indicator that spontaneous major disorder or violence would not occur. This appears to have also been the conclusion of the MPS assessment of the intelligence.

### **3.4 The Likelihood of the Crowd Outside Wembley Becoming Disorderly as the Day Progressed**

Although there have been a few “mass jibs” in its history, Wembley has not historically been a magnet for large numbers of ticketless fans to gather to celebrate either pre- or post-match. The pubs in the vicinity of the stadium have traditionally not had good reputations as attractive spaces to either drink or celebrate due to pricing and lack of capacity. Instead, gatherings ahead of finals have tended to occur away from Wembley (e.g. Sunderland fans in Trafalgar Square in 2019). As a result, there is no historical reputation for Wembley being a stadium that attracts disorder or violence in its environs.

However, in recent years, the development of the spaces outside Wembley have started to create environments that are more conducive and attractive to carnivalesque gatherings. “Wembley Plaza”, the space outside the new White Horse pub, appears to be the most important of these spaces, and earlier matches at Euro2020 saw large gatherings here (particularly for the games against Germany and Denmark). This is due to the configuration and acoustics of the space, the proximity to the stadium and “Wembley Way”, and the availability of take-away alcohol from supermarkets. The gathering ahead of the Germany game was reported by MPS as involving considerable transgressive behaviour, including some anti-social behaviour, but was not considered to be disorderly or violent.

It was predictable that the spaces populated for these earlier matches would be more popular for the final (see Sections 1 and 2, above) and would need crowd management and policing interventions from an early stage in the day. Fans wishing to engage in carnivalesque forms of

transgression would have been attracted to these spaces, as would ticket holders merely wishing to feel part of the celebration of the final. Indeed, images from early on in the day show families with young children present to watch the celebrations.

As we have seen, intoxicated football crowds, intent on engaging in carnivalesque celebration, have the potential to become disorderly and even violent if they are confronted or frustrated, but this remains rare. Section 4 will set out how proactive crowd management and dialogue has been shown to be successful in reducing the risk of disorder or reducing the number of crowd members who become involved in disorder. Ultimately, it appears that there was little use of dialogue-based approaches to crowd management as the crowd was gathering, the setting of tolerance limits, or interventions against individuals in the crowd engaging in problematic behaviour. All these tactics have been shown to be effective in reducing the likelihood or extent of disorder developing, including in relation to gatherings of England fans abroad.

As the day progressed, the crowd became denser and more intoxicated. Additionally, anti-social behaviour became more common, with more crowd members engaged in ASB. As acts such as the throwing of bottles became more common, it was less likely that fans would feel empowered to intervene and engage in self-policing. In this crowd would have also been individuals intent on attempting a “jib” nearer kick-off. These individuals would have been keen to see congestion and confusion, but would not want the crowd to become so disorderly that it would be dispersed or that external security perimeters would be strengthened.

Many fans who had attended the spaces to watch the party would have started to look for ways to escape the overcrowding, which would have become easier once the outer security cordon was opened. However, as non-transgressive crowd members departed this would have further changed the make-up of the crowd. In short, as the afternoon progressed, those making up the crowd were more likely to be individuals who wanted a transgressive and carnivalesque experience even if this included widespread anti-social behaviour and incidents of disorder, which, in the absence of challenge from police/security or self-policing, were increasingly becoming accepted practice in the crowd.

By late afternoon it should have become clear that there would be a problem with the ticketless fans remaining in the crowd because there is nowhere available for them to watch the match. There were reports of long queues for pubs that were already over-capacity and as the kick-off approached, some pubs were also reported to be closing. There were no big screens, and reported problems with mobile phone reception would mean that even watching the match on a smartphone would be difficult. Thousands of highly intoxicated fans were now left very close to the stadium but with no means of watching the most significant match in their lifetimes.

In this crowd were some individuals who had travelled with the intention of “jibbing” into the stadium, but many would have initially intended to find a pub to watch the match, whether near

Wembley or even in another part of London, but had now run out of opportunity for the first and out of time for the second. News of early successful jibs would have started to reach individuals in this crowd through social media and word-of-mouth, and with the knowledge of the number of unsold seats at Wembley, this would have encouraged what became the “Wembley mass jib”. For new or inexperienced “jibbers”, rushing the outer security cordon in a disorderly manner would have seemed the only way of getting to the gates and turnstiles of the stadium.

Footage shows how the outer security cordon at the bottom of the Wembley steps is overrun by members of this crowd from several different angles. Timing suggests this coincided with the national anthems being played, which would have been audible to the crowd outside. Another major rush occurred when England scored. Again, this suggests that attempts to jib at this time were predominantly spontaneous rather than pre-planned. Experienced “jibbers” would have planned to gain access to the stadium, predominantly through means of subterfuge, well before this time, when turnstiles would have been busier, so while this does look like a coordinated attempt to break into the stadium, it is unlikely that this was planned far in advance but was instead an outcome of how the evening developed. It also meant that this attempt to “jib” into the stadium would be disorderly and violent rather than one based on more typical methods of subterfuge.

### **3.5 Wembley Stadium as a Likely Venue for Disorder**

Serious disorder and inter-personal violence inside stadiums in this country is relatively rare. A major reason for this is that stadiums are generally well-managed and highly-regulated spaces with extensive CCTV coverage, and subsequently probably a high-level of deterrence. Disorder is, however, more common when fans travel away from home into a less familiar environment. Disorder is also more common in concourses where fans are forced, by current legislation, to consume alcohol they have purchased at bars in the stadium. The reported crushes and conflicts in the stadium concourse were therefore largely predictable.

Wembley generally, however, does not have a reputation as being a stadium where violence or disorder is commonplace; indeed, it is one of the few stadiums in the country where fans of rival clubs regularly find themselves sitting together in “neutral” sections for cup finals.

Serious disorder and mass violence inside the stands at Wembley stadium was not very probable, particularly due to the fact that even a successful mass “jib” should not have placed the stadium over-capacity and would have been less likely to cause conflict between ticket holders and non-ticket holders. Further, the scenes of ticket holders fighting fans who had broken into the stadium in the concourse were highly unusual.



### 3.6 Conclusions

*The foreseeability or otherwise of disorder among England fan outside Wembley Stadium ahead of, during and after the Euro 2020 Final*

Given the history of England fans and the lack of alternative open spaces to gather, it was always highly probable that there would be persistent, if low-level, anti-social behaviour in the environs of Wembley throughout the day, and that this would get worse as the day progressed, the crowd increased, and individuals became more intoxicated. Some element of disorder was also highly probable around Wembley. At the start of the day, it was possible that there would be large-scale disorder in the crowd, but this was certainly not something that was probable, never mind unavoidable. However, by the time it had become clear that there were still thousands of intoxicated ticketless fans outside Wembley with nowhere to go to watch the match (in the period 18.00-20.00), further serious disorder related to an attempt to break into the stadium became highly probable.

*4. What if any measures could have prevented disorder among England fans outside Wembley Stadium ahead of, during and after the Euro 2020 Final?*

#### 4.1 Human Rights Considerations

In a number of domestic and European Court of Human Rights cases this century it has been established that the ECHR rights of Free Expression and Free Assembly apply to social and cultural gatherings, in addition to protest. Therefore, an attempt to impose a blanket ban upon fans gathering to celebrate England's first European Championship Final appearance would only be compliant with the police's obligations under s.6 Human Rights Act 1998 if they had firm intelligence that the nature of the assembly would not be peaceful (and this needed to go beyond intelligence that some individuals in the crowd were intending to "jib" the final or gather in locations that would be disruptive), or that there was a clear and imminent risk to public order or public health and the proposed restrictions were proportionate and necessary. I have seen nothing to suggest such intelligence existed or that an attempt to stop gatherings would have either been lawful or effective. Effectively, based on the evidence I have seen, the MPS had a positive obligation under the HRA to protect the rights of fans to initially gather.

Later in the evening, and certainly by kick-off, it could be argued that the nature of the crowd had ceased to be peaceful, allowing dispersal or containment with no proportionality consideration. Similarly, when the build-up of the crowd meant that social distancing was impossible, or when the number of bottles being thrown meant it had become disorderly, it could also be argued that the police had a legitimate objective to disperse the crowd to satisfy

the first element of the test of proportionality. However, it is unlikely that such a tactic would have been effective at either reducing the risk of Covid-19 infection or of disorder (and may have made it worse). Indeed, an attempt to disperse the crowd as kick off approached could have risked life, and possibly infringed the police's obligations under Article 2 ECHR (Right to Life) (see 4.6 below). In short, it is my view that the MPS acted in accordance with their Art.10 and 11 obligations under the Human Rights Act and ECHR.

## **4.2 Managing Carnavalesque Football Crowds**

Large carnivalesque gatherings around significant matches are an established norm of football fan behaviour, and there is a wealth of experience and know-how in the police service and amongst the football authorities about what strategies, tactics, and physical infrastructure are effective at safely and securely managing fan gatherings, including those that are likely to involve transgressive behaviour. There is also significant academic research comparing tactics used in situations where large football gatherings have been managed successfully, and those that have resulted in mass disorder or violence. We know, for example, that similar (in terms of membership, on-pitch result, and levels of intoxication) gatherings of fans are more or less likely to become involved in mass disorder depending on policing approaches.

The science underpinning the effective policing of football crowds is derived predominantly from social psychology and the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM). ESIM has identified that large scale disorder at gatherings is almost always a result of social interactions rather than predisposition or "mob mentality". Research conducted at Italia '90, France 1998, Euro2000 identified the extent to which policing strategies based upon early police non-intervention, followed by "show of force" interventions that could be seen as illegitimate by crowd members, were more likely to result in a football crowd becoming disorderly. Conversely, policing operations based upon early and continuing dialogue and positive interaction, the establishment and communication of realistic tolerance limits on behaviour, and targeted and proportionate interventions against transgressors of these established limits are significantly less likely to see large-scale crowd disorder or violence, and if this occurs, more likely to quickly manage and de-escalate it.

These findings have subsequently been evaluated by research teams at Euro2004 (Portugal) and the 2006 World Cup (Germany), as well as the 'Enable' projects (domestic football). Indeed, at Euro2004, ESIM was applied successfully by the PSP force in Lisbon and Coimbra. ESIM's understanding of crowd policing is also reflected in the EU Football Policing Handbook, the Council of Europe's Convention on Policing Football Matches with an International Dimension, and the forthcoming iteration of the College of Policing/UKFPU Authorised Professional Practice in Football Policing. The research is therefore internationally established and embedded into national and European policing guidance. I will consider the extent to which this guidance was applied by MPS as the day progressed in 4.4 and 4.6.

#### **4.3 What impact did the lack of venues for celebration and to watch the match have?**

As has been established in Sections 1 and 2, above, the lack of venues for ticketless fans to gather to celebrate the Final drew crowds of greater numbers to the environs of Wembley Stadium than would otherwise have been the case. This was almost certainly exacerbated by the reduced capacity available in pubs and other venues (due to closure or limited capacity) caused by Covid-19 restrictions. Had large and well-publicised “fan zones” been established elsewhere in London this would have reduced the numbers of ticketless fans gathering outside Wembley and meant that more of those who had gathered were likely to disperse in the hours before kick-off. This would in turn have reduced the levels of disorder and violence that occurred, particularly as kick-off approached.

It is more difficult to establish what effect big screens around Wembley would have had on the crowd. A screening of the match in a space like Wembley Plaza would have almost certainly reduced the number of fans who attacked and breached the outer security cordon as the national anthems played and when the first goal was scored. However, it is likely that had a large-scale screening near Wembley been advertised, this would have led to more ticketless fans converging on the environs of the stadium. While these would not have had a disorderly intent, significant additional fans could have created further problems in terms of crushing and disorder as the afternoon progressed.

#### **4.4 Was there sufficient early dialogue and setting of tolerance limits by MPS?**

I have not seen the Operational Order for the match, or heard any debrief from MPS, but from the evidence I have seen, there appears to be at best a minimal attempt by police officers to proactively engage with crowd members. Police officers are almost completely absent from stills from CCTV footage showing the build-up of the crowd on Wembley Way and the spaces around it. In effect it appears that police were almost completely absent from within the crowd at all stages during the day (although from 15.00 onwards, groups of police can be seen on the edges of the crowds). This tallies with reports that the bulk of policing resources planned for the day were only deployed at 14.30, half an hour earlier than planned but almost five hours after the first concerns about crowds of ticketless fans were expressed.

Even when they were deployed, these officers largely appear to have been stood in groups outside the crowd, rather than engaging in dialogue with crowd members. There is some evidence of engagement from pairs and individual officers, including at 17.00 where an officer in a cap (rather than a helmet) can be seen talking to a couple of fans. However, this officer appears to be stood in a static filter cordon so it is likely the fans approached him. This reflects academic concerns about the limitations of PSU officers deployed in this way in terms of their ability to engage in positive interaction (in contrast to spotters or PLTs).



Once bottle-throwing in the crowd was reported, from around 15.00, it is more understandable why officers would not have been deployed as these may have required riot gear and helmets and would be less capable of effective liaison. Nevertheless, the late deployment of officers and the failure to engage with fans as the crowd was building looks like a significant failure in the policing operation. To what extent early intervention of this nature would have reduced the levels of disorder is difficult to predict. Effective communication would almost certainly have had a positive effect upon some crowd members, but whether the subsequent reduction on levels of disorder and criminality would have been marginal or significant is difficult to say. It is likely that some disorder, violence, and attempts at “jibbing” would have taken place regardless of the use of dialogue-based tactics. Nevertheless, there appears to have been a failure to apply accepted crowd science and public order policing guidance from an early stage in the proceedings.

#### **4.5 What was the role of specialist dialogue or football officers?**

According to the information I have been given, there were three Oracle Units deployed from 12.00 around Wembley, consisting of 28 “spotters”; i.e. Dedicated Football Officers (DFOs), or Football Intelligence Officers (Spotters/OFOs). There appear to have been no Police Liaison Officer teams (PLTs) present around Wembley. Given the intelligence picture, the deployment of the three spotter units looks sensible. These officers possess extensive skills to liaise with football fans, including those posing a risk of engagement in violence or disorder. They are a vital tactic in the management of domestic football crowds and have also demonstrated their value abroad in crowds of England fans (especially in Lille at Euro2016). Deployed in pairs into the crowd as it started to build, they could have played a vital role in the type of engagement set out in 4.4.

However, the CCTV stills do not show any DFOs/OFOs in the building crowds outside Wembley until 18.30, when there appear to be two spotters patrolling near the Olympic Steps. This is surprising, and I cannot explain from the evidence I have had access to, why, given the three units present in the Wembley environs, spotters cannot be seen on any of the CCTV stills or other images of the crowd between 12.00 and 18.30, or are not mentioned in the reports or fan survey responses. Had DFOs/OFOs (or PLTs) been in the crowd as it built up, they would have provided the ability to try and establish tolerance limits, dissuade individuals from disorderly behaviour, and exclude some of those engaged in violence.

Had this been a protest crowd, I would have expected to have seen PLTs engaged in dialogue with crowd members from very early on. While PLTs are rarely used in football crowds, some forces have deployed them successfully.

As with my assessment in 4.4, whether the more proactive use of spotters within the crowd, or the use of PLTs, would have had a marginal or significant reduction on levels of disorder or criminality is difficult to establish.

#### **4.6 Should MPS have looked to disperse the crowd as kick off approached?**

By 18.00, the crowds by the Olympic Steps and in the spaces around this had become congested and disorderly, with reports of regular pyrotechnics and bottle throwing. By 19.00, CCTV stills from the bottom of the Olympic Steps show a dangerously-congested crowd pushing against unstable crowd-control barriers. This crowd was probably a single trip or falling barrier away from a serious and possibly fatal crowd crush.

At this point, an intervention by officers into the crowd would have required both the use of riot gear (due to the missiles being thrown) and the use of coercive force to enter the crowd (due to the congestion). This could have exacerbated the problem of crushing and potentially caused a progressive crowd collapse. Such an intervention would also have run the risk of causing resistance from some crowd members who perceived the intervention as illegitimate (particularly if it was seen as dangerous or aggressive) which in turn could have exacerbated disorder.

An alternative tactic could have been to try and disperse the crowd gathered at the bottom of the steps using a combination of horses, dogs, and batons, all of which were by this time available in the vicinity. However, this could also have caused a progressive crowd collapse as fans tried to disperse. Moreover, such an intervention would almost certainly have been perceived as illegitimate (particularly by those in the crowd with genuine tickets) and as a result have been likely to lead to an increase in disorder and violence, and injuries to both crowd members and police officers. Either outcome would have also endangered life, thereby breaching MPS's obligation under the Human Rights Act and ECHR Article 2.

In sum, by 18.00 the crowd pressing against the outer security cordon, and in particular at the foot of the Olympic Steps, had become too dense and unruly to safely deploy officers into or to try and disperse. Such an intervention would have almost certainly exacerbated disorder and violence and MPS took the right decision not to intervene once this situation had arisen.

I cannot be sure from the evidence I have been provided exactly when PSU officers were deployed at the top of the steps or where they had previously been. They were certainly present by 20.30, half an hour after a number of breaches of the outer security cordon at the bottom of the Wembley steps. The deployment from 20.30 onwards looks effective, but given the crowds of ticketless fans, it would have been sensible if this had been put in place prior to the arrivals of the teams onto the pitch (even though this would have caused problems for fans with genuine tickets who were arriving late).

#### **4.7 Should there have been more police officers deployed around Wembley Stadium?**

The MPS resourcing plan indicates that the first dedicated units deployed onto the Wembley environs were the three spotter units at 12.00. These were bolstered by two deployments of PSUs which were either brought forward or redeployed from elsewhere (11.30 and 14.30) and a community engagement team (13.00). This indicates the operation had some ability to respond proactively to the developing situation. Further planned resources arrived at 15.00, and by 17.33, there were a total of 553 officers, including spotters, mounted, and dog units, around Wembley stadium.

The total number of officers around Wembley should have been sufficient to manage the crowd, but it is clear that there were two overarching problems. First, it is clear that the deployment of the bulk of police resources was far too late. Problems were being reported by mid-morning and yet the main deployments were not planned until 15.00 and were not brought forward before 14.30. Secondly, it is clear that there was insufficient proactive communication between officers and crowd members in the early stages of the event. This is connected to the late deployment, although there is no reason I am aware of why those officers already in the Wembley environs should not have been active in the crowd. The fan survey overwhelmingly supports the picture from the CCTV stills and other images, that there were remarkably few officers in and around the crowd as it built up, particularly given the disorder, anti-social behaviour, and overt taking of Class A drugs.

#### **4.8 Was the Outer Security Cordon Suitable?**

CCTV and various reports throughout the build-up to kick-off identify numerous breaches of the temporary outer perimeter, including the Heras fencing and crowd-control barriers. The mass breaches of the perimeter around the time of the national anthem show that the cordon at the foot of the Olympic Steps was not fit-for-purpose. Fans were able to climb over the wall at the bottom of the Olympic Steps, landing on the steps *behind* the perimeter. Fans are also able to push through the crowd-control barriers at the other side of the steps.

The temporary, waist-high, crowd-control barriers are not designed to prevent crowd incursions and had been shown to be ineffective during the anti-Glazer protests outside Old Trafford several months before (under pressure from fewer fans). They are also potentially dangerous in a dense crowd, posing a trip (and therefore progressive crowd collapse) risk, and in a worst-case scenario, could see fans in a crowd crush trapped under them.

The fencing not only proved ineffective and dangerous, but it would also have provided little visible deterrent to those ticketless fans who wished to enter the stadium. It should be remembered that fans who have attended Wembley before may not have seen outer security cordons in operation before and may have not been expecting them to be in place. A more sturdy and visible physical perimeter would have reduced the number of breaches and would



most likely have deterred many of ticketless fans who engaged in disorder to rush the outer security cordon.

#### **4.9 Should Access to Alcohol Have Been Limited or Otherwise Controlled?**

Given the disinhibiting effects of alcohol, this report will conclude by asking whether attempts should have been made to reduce the availability of alcohol either inside or outside the stadium. The first thing to note is that the psychopharmacological link between alcohol consumption and violence is not clear – the evidence suggests that, at most, increased alcohol makes some people more violent some of the time. An analysis of England fan behaviour going back 25 years suggests there is no evidence that England fans are more likely to engage in disorder the more they drink. Conversely, attempts to reduce access to alcohol, have been associated with certain problematic behaviours (e.g. at Italia'90).

The main problem as the afternoon progressed seemed to be that, due to a lack of official outlets serving beer, fans either purchased beer from nearby off-licenses/supermarkets or brought their own alcohol. There were also some reports of alcohol being delivered by couriers or sold out of cool-boxes. The problem here was predominantly that beer was served in containers that could be used as missiles. This was particularly problematic with the sale of bottled beer. The fact that some bottles were being thrown was not only a danger to individual safety, but it also meant that police lost the tactical option of being able to send small numbers of police into the crowd to act in a liaison capacity because of a legitimate fear for officer safety.

If the supermarkets and off-licenses had not been serving alcohol, this would have reduced the amount of missiles and reduced levels of intoxication. It would also have probably encouraged ticketless fans to depart the environs of Wembley sooner and fans with tickets to enter the stadium, where alcohol was on sale, earlier. It would not have stopped fans obtaining alcohol from elsewhere or bringing their own, and would not have stopped some fans wishing to “jib” the stadium or from becoming involved in disorder. However, the prohibition of the sale of alcohol from takeaway outlets in the immediate vicinity of the stadium would have almost certainly had a beneficial effect in reducing the size of the crowd in the Wembley Stadium environs.

Another option to control when and how alcohol was sold outside the stadium would have been to open temporary beer outlets (serving in plastic glasses only), this may have led to more fans purchasing alcohol in safe containers rather than in cans and bottles. It would have been preferable to the situation that arose on the day. Such a tactic would have been unlikely to reduce levels of intoxication, but, alongside a prohibition of alcohol sales elsewhere, it could potentially have been used to try and move the crowd away from the outer cordon as the afternoon progressed and, more generally, to thin the crowd out. However, we have seen

occasions where disorder has occurred when outlets have stopped selling beer, in addition to attempts to steal beer, so this option would not have come without risk.

At the Safety Advisory Group following England v Germany, the decision was made to continue to allow the sale of beer inside Wembley, despite concerns about fan behaviour and intoxication in the concourse and seats. On balance, in my view this was the correct decision, and as crowds built outside, the availability of beer inside the stadium would have encouraged some ticket holders to enter the stadium earlier, thereby reducing the crush and disorder outside. However, it is clear that there was both crushing and anti-social behaviour in the stadium concourse before kick-off and at half-time, some of which was related to fans trying to purchase beer and/or consuming it. Ultimately, and not for the first time, the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 is causing problems; by prohibiting fans from taking their drink into the stands, the legislation is encouraging fans to remain in a crowded concourse, exacerbating the problems of crushing, anti-social behaviour, and spillage.

#### **4.10 Conclusions**

*What if any measures could have prevented disorder among England fans outside Wembley Stadium ahead of, during and after the Euro 2020 Final?*

It is clear that MPS were put in a very difficult position by the lack of alternative spaces in which fans, and in particular ticketless fans, could gather to celebrate England's appearance in the Final, and an absence of large screens for ticketless fans to watch the match. However, given that a large gathering of ticketless fans on, and in the spaces around, Wembley Way was highly predictable, there were a number of different approaches that could have been used to try and better manage the crowd, reduce disorder and violence within it, and encourage ticketless fans to disperse from the area before it was too late to watch the match at alternative locations. Whether any or all of these tactics would have had a marginal or a significant effect on the levels of disorder and violence on the day is difficult to predict, but they are all established tactics in crowd and/or football policing and I cannot see how they would not have reduced levels of disorder and violence:

- Deployment of teams of officers into the crowd from late morning, tasked to engage in positive interaction with crowd members, set down realistic behavioural tolerance limits, and intervene against those breaking those limits.
- Better deployment of the three spotter units with a focus on proactive dialogue.
- Use of specialist Liaison Officers and teams that are regularly used for protest (PLTs).

Once the crowd had become disorderly, bottle throwing had started, and crushes were starting to develop, there was little that MPS could do other than establish a protective cordon around the stadium to prevent and deter further attempts to break into the stadium, particularly given the failings of the outer security cordon. I do not have sufficient evidence to be sure whether

the MPS deployment at the top of the Olympic Stairs had been established prior to the start of the national anthems, which were always likely to have led to attempts to break into the stadium as ticketless and intoxicated fans realised they were not going to see the final. Once the line was established, it appears that it was successful in preventing large numbers of ticketless fans from gaining access up the Olympic stairs to the stadium entrances.

In terms of licensing and sale of alcohol, a prohibition on local supermarkets and off-licenses selling beer in bottles would have reduced the number of missiles, reduced the risk of injury, and made it easier for MPS officers to engage in proactive dialogue with fans in the crowd later in the afternoon.

The final measure which would most likely have had a positive impact upon levels of disorder, would have been the construction of a more robust and more visible physical outer security perimeter which would (a) have been more capable of withstanding attempts to breach it than the insufficient crowd-control and Heras fencing, and (b) have been more visible to fans approaching the perimeter, thereby hopefully acting as a deterrent to some of those who decided to attempt to gain access to the stadium without tickets. However, I am not peritus to provide opinion on what the exact nature of such a cordon should have been, nor where it should have been positioned.



## **Wembley: Euro 2021 Final**

The role of social media in disruptive behaviour

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## Context

As part of the Independent Review investigating the catalysts for disorder around the Euro 2021 finals, Signify Group were contracted by the Review Secretariat to determine:

**‘to what extent the disorder on the day was coordinated and incited using public social media’.**

Our team were limited in this instance to the use of public social data, which means all of **Twitter**, but also fan reactions to public posts on **Facebook** and **Instagram** and **TikTok**, and an audit of relevant public posts including **TikTok**, **YouTube** and football fan forums.

The focus of this investigation was the extent to which public social media was used to organise, incite or promote disorderly behaviour on the day of the Euro 2021 final (and in the week beforehand). To provide a framework for investigation, the Review and Signify worked together on a framework for research based on three specific hypotheses about the role of digital media in public disorder. The team were also tasked to validate or disprove a set of specific allegations made in the press about online incitement and organised ticketless entry coordinated on social media.

## Specific hypotheses

These are the three framing hypotheses for the study:

- **Public incitement and organisation** – that public social media was used to incite disorder and to incite or organise ticketless entry. Exploring to what extent other social media users engaged with such posts.
- **Role of social media design** – the way content is presented and promoted on social media saw fans who engaged with disorderly posts subsequently exposed to more similar content, creating a crescendo of engagement with extreme content in the hours before the final.
- **Role of social media in inviting ticketless fans to Wembley** – some accounts encouraged ticketless fans to visit Wembley, through the tournament and especially on final match day.

## Allegations

The following allegations appeared in press coverage of the disorder surrounding the final. Each related to the role of social media in encouraging and enabling disorder and ticketless entry.

1. That links to Telegram and WhatsApp groups offering information/tips on how to "jib" were circulating on Twitter in the run up to the final. [\[source\]](#)
2. That people were boasting on social media about sneaking into Eng v Den without a ticket following the semi-final and ahead of the final. [\[source\]](#)
3. That a steward posted an advert selling his bib and lanyard on Facebook on the day of the match. [\[source\]](#)
4. That #wembleyjib was trending on Twitter on match day. [\[source\]](#)



# Methodology

## Data gathering

For clarity, any reference to 'disorderly posts' in this study concerns posts which encourage or support jibbing or enquire about how to jib into Wembley.

Signify pulled relevant posts from social media using relevant keywords including 'Wembley', 'euro21', '#engita' and '#engden' to capture the widest possible sample of tournament-related posts from the week leading up to the final. We looked for fan engagement across multiple channels.

Twitter was by far the biggest data pool for us, with 31,572 relevant posts from the week leading up to the final. Of these only 302 (fewer than 1%) were disorderly posts that contained problematic content or incitement. Twitter is popular with football fans, and used for live coverage, highlights, journalism and gambling tips. The channel has a correspondingly high volume of football posts.







To pull data from Instagram and TikTok we used an archiving tool that pulls all the posts associated with a given hashtag. This allowed us to verify that there is no content on either platform relating to #wembleyjib as of our data pull on Tuesday 28 September. There were huge numbers of posts (over 100,000) relating to #jibbing on Instagram and TikTok but the term also relates to snowboarding, skateboarding and BMX. We looked at the top 200 most-viral posts on each platform and saw no content relating to football.

We were able to pull and review thousands of very relevant posts on Instagram (2,000 sample from over 12,500 total) and TikTok (564 videos) using the hashtags #EngDen and #EngIta. This data set did contain a handful of disorderly posts.

Facebook and forums are both very significant in long term football culture but less so in live matchday interaction. We ran conventional analytics searches for #Wembleyjib and the fixture tags, but turned up no relevant disorderly posts. We also searched YouTube manually and found a small amount of highly relevant content.

The following pages detail the queries and tasks used to break down each of the specific hypotheses and allegations. To jump ahead to the findings of the report, [click here](#).

## Summary of data pulls

Channel	Activity	Valid data	Findings
	Enterprise API pull: 100% of relevant posts / accounts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ 31,572 posts</li> <li>✓ &lt; 300 disorderly</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Some evidence of incitement</li> <li>▪ Some Telegram group promotion</li> </ul>
	4K hashtag searches 100% of tagged posts / accounts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>× No jibbing content</li> <li>× 2,000 match posts (sample)</li> </ul>	n/a
	4K hashtag searches 100% of tagged posts / accounts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ 0 <u>#wembleyjiib</u> clips</li> <li>✓ 564 <u>#engden</u> <u>#engita</u> clips</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Low engagement (per benchmarks)</li> <li>▪ No link sharing</li> </ul>
  	Boolean analytics search 'Public' results only – 7% of posts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ 2,000 Facebook posts (sample)</li> <li>✓ 5 relevant YouTube videos</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Low engagement (per benchmarks)</li> <li>▪ No link sharing</li> </ul>

## Methodology: analysis of hypothesis

**Hypothesis 1:** *that public social media was used to incite disorder and to incite or organise ticketless entry. Exploring to what extent other social media users engaged with such posts.*

**Query Rules:** Look at posts on 11/7/21 with 1,000+ retweets about 'Wembley', 'ENGvITA', 'Euro Final', 'ticketless', 'jib', etc.

**Analysis Task:** How many of the top posts (a sample from those with 1,000 or more re-tweets) feature disorder, and how many specifically encourage it, discourage it or present it without commentary.

---

**Hypothesis 2** - *the way content is presented and promoted on social media saw fans who engaged with disorderly posts subsequently exposed to more similar content, creating a crescendo of engagement with extreme content in the hours before the final.*

**Query Rules:** Conclusion piece – qualitative and third-party research

*Please note: following feedback from the Review secretariat, we augmented our theoretical and technical findings with a look back on the timelines of fans who had 'Liked' disorderly posts, to see if they'd previously 'Liked' other football content.*

**Analysis Task:** written findings and recommendations in final report

---

**Hypothesis 3** – that some accounts encouraged ticketless fans to visit Wembley, through the tournament and especially on final match day.

**Query Rules:** Before final kick-off, look into mentions of ticketless, jib, without ticket, etc and see if any are popular. Include retweets.

**Analysis Task:** Take a sample and see if any encourage the action.



## Methodology: analysis of allegations

**Allegation #1:** links to private groups offering information/tips on how to "jib" were circulating on Twitter before the final

**Query rules:** Look for mentions of Telegram group "the Wembley jib" in discovery phase – if possible, finding the actual URL being linked to. Then build a query based on the name and the URL in the week or two before the final. Include retweets.

**Analysis task:** Raw count of total posts, and how many retweets, replies, likes and quote tweets they received.

**Allegation #2:** That people were boasting on social media about sneaking into Eng v Den without a ticket following the semi-final

**Query rules:** Look for terms like 'ENGvDEN', 'Denmark', 'Wembley', 'semi-final' alongside terms like 'for free', 'without a ticket', 'jib', 'ticketless', 'broke in', 'stormed gates'. Exclude retweets.

**Analysis task:** See total counts and assess whether significant volumes of people were genuinely talking about having done it.

---

**Allegation #3:** That a steward posted an advert selling his bib and lanyard on Facebook day of the match.

**Query/Analysis:** Not applicable. This has been reported by *The Sun* and the police say they're investigating it.

*Signify looked for any stewards discussing low pay, or any jibbers wearing vests*

---

**Allegation #4:** That #wembleyjib was trending on Twitter on match day

**Query rules:** Mentions of #WembleyJib or 'Wembley jib' on July 11th. Exclude retweets.

**Analysis Task:** Raw count of total posts, and how many retweets, replies, likes and quote tweets they received.

# Findings

## Results Summary

- Looking at 31,572 relevant tweets pertaining to the subject matter, just 302 were disorderly or even related to disorder or jibbing – less than 1% of match day posts.
- There are zero instances of pro-jibbing posts going viral. All viral coverage portrays jibbing and disorder in a negative light.
- Hundreds of fans talked about unfair ticket pricing. We only picked up seven of those conversations where social media users proposed jibbing as the only viable option.

## Proving/Disproving hypotheses

- **Hypothesis 1:** *that public social media was used to incite disorder and to incite or organise ticketless entry.*

**Result:** Public social media was not a useful organizing platform: posts asking how to jib received zero interactions. Although we saw one mention of a jibbing Telegram group in our analysis, the platform was not used to promote the group, or to organize or coordinate. We detected zero evidence of organisation or incitement on TikTok, Instagram or Facebook.

- **Hypothesis 2:** the way content is presented and promoted on social media saw fans who engaged with disorderly posts subsequently exposed to more similar content, creating a crescendo of engagement with extreme content in the hours before the final.

**Result:** Social media dynamics definitely created wider exposure for disorderly posts. Of the 50 accounts that we looked at who had 'Liked' or commented negatively on disorderly posts, all 50 had previously 'Liked' posts about the final, or the semi-final.

- **Hypothesis 3:** – some accounts encouraged ticketless fans to visit Wembley, through the tournament and especially on final match day.

**Result:** We found no evidence of social accounts encouraging travel to Wembley by ticketless fans.

## Addressing specific allegations

- **Allegation 1:** That links to Telegram and WhatsApp groups offering information/tips on how to "jib" were circulating on Twitter in the run up to the final

**Result:** We found the link to jibbing Telegram. It was only shared once on public Twitter and referenced 11 times. We searched for the link on other platforms but could not find any other instances of it in public posts. This doesn't truly constitute wide circulation – however the link did exist.

- **Allegation 2:** That people were boasting on social media about sneaking into Eng v Den without a ticket following the semi-final and ahead of the final.

**Result:** People did boast on social about accessing the semi-final without tickets, in posts we found on both Twitter and TikTok. However, these posts did not attract many viewers. Which means that although anybody with an interest in trying to access the stadium without a ticket could have easily found these posts, it is very unlikely that other England fans saw the posts unless they specifically searched for them.

- **Allegation 3:** That a steward posted an advert selling his bib and lanyard on Facebook day of the match.


**Result:** This incident is documented and under investigation. We also did not find significant evidence of stewards complaining about pay or conditions – although there were 151 mentions of stewards being under pressure from the public. (See [timeline](#))

- **Allegation 4:** That #wembleyjib was trending on Twitter on match day.


**Result:** Demonstrably false: #wembleyjib never trended





## Disorderly tweet timeline (prior fortnight)



## Disorderly tweet timeline (48 hours up to the final)



- Posts encouraging disorderly conduct spiked in the hours around the incident.
- The timeline suggests no incitement or organisation earlier in the day (or at any point)
- The majority of disorderly posts offer solidarity and encouragement (as seen on right) and not practical advice on how to jib.



## Findings per Hypothesis

**Hypothesis 1:** *that public social media was used to incite disorder and to incite or organise ticketless entry.*

- All high-engagement posts refer to the jibbing event that took place as a negative. There are no high-engagement posts encouraging this behaviour.
- When filtering top engagement tweets there were some instances where tweets were condoning the behaviour
  - There are instances where tweets were condoning the behaviour, and some even being upset that ticketless fans were getting punched while trying to get in.
  - Some boasted about making it in the stadium without a ticket and others even referring to it as “an art form”
  - Some accounts were encouraging others to make it inside
  - On Twitter, disorderly posts had between 0 -94 likes and 0- 13 retweets - not significant compared to viral content
  - On Tik Tok, all disorderly videos had fewer than 30 Likes
  - Our data pull retrieved no posts on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube or Reddit with significant engagement
- No significant signs of organisation except people asking who else would be jibbing [posts received between 3 and 0 comments]
- The low number of retweets and comments on disorderly posts rules out Twitter and other channels as an organising portal
- Some posts asked how to jib but such posts always had between 0 and 2 interactions, with a very low number of replies (we did pick up some links in our research for hypothesis 3)



**A note on illustrations:** *the text of sensitive posts has been altered (without changing meaning) and identifiable handles apart from news channels have been blurred to protect the anonymity of posters*



**Hypothesis 2:** *the way content is presented and promoted on social media saw fans who engaged with disorderly posts subsequently exposed to more similar content, creating a crescendo of engagement with extreme content in the hours before the final.*

This hypothesis was supported by looking back on timelines of parties who had engaged with disorderly posts. Whether they were supporting or condemning disorderly posts, a look at the previous 'Likes' of 50 fans that engaged with disorderly posts revealed that all of them without exception had previously engaged with benign content about either the final or the semi-final featuring England. This at least shows that the disorderly posts had come to their attention in a football fandom context.

In addition, there are various well-documented design features of social media that supported this crescendo effect:

- Social algorithms make account suggestions based on a number of factors such as location, and contact details, but also based on user activity, such as posts they made or interacted with, who they follow and accounts users interact with. This was the experience of fans throughout the tournament. If you liked clips, previews, or tips, or posts by pundits you would be shown more during the days that followed.
- When permitted to scan third party data, platforms including Twitter, Facebook and Instagram make personalized content suggestions based on what a user views across the web. For example if a user frequently visits football websites, then social platforms suggest accounts and posts aligned with football fandom.
- Social algorithms permit user feedback 'Don't show me this type of post' but these are largely genre-based and wouldn't distinguish between football match clips, fandom and disorderly posts.
- Twitter, as a news platform, has two channel-specific issues with amplification:
  - Journalists rely on Twitter (more than other channels) for live news, and human interest stories around matchday. This was evident in the number of journalists retweeting posts about fan celebrations on the morning of the final.
  - The Topic function clusters fan content automatically and makes it easy for fans to compile video diaries. (Several of these Wembley topics became definitive for news media covering the events of the day.)

## Example: Social Media Dynamics

1100 - 1200 footage of fan antics with a flare in Leicester Square goes viral



1200 - 1600: Thousands of football fans interact with and re-share 'flare' posts

Social algorithms learn a new pattern: football fans love flare content



17:00 Social platforms promote footage of fans throwing flares at the police, dropping clips into the feeds of football fans in the hours before the game

**Please note**, this is a hypothetical example of algorithmic timeline curation, and not based on empirical data or validated by social platforms.

Images from *The Sun* and *ITV News*

### Hypothesis 3: Accounts encouraging ticketless fans

- From a sample of 100 posts discussing ticketless visits to Wembley, only 3 posts were positive or supportive
- Of accounts we saw encouraging ticketless fans to visit Wembley, emphasis was on comradery with fellow jibbers rather than detail or organisation.
- The tweets with the most engagement in this category had 94 likes, 2 retweets, 2 quote tweets, and 8 comments – not significant in terms of virality on Twitter.
- There are six relevant videos on YouTube discussing the ease of ticketless entry to Wembley. One is historic (ten years ago), three were filmed on the day of the final, but the other two describe in detail how fans broke into different Euro games. One video (posted 1st July, 2021) has 4,500 views and the other (posted 8th July, 2021) has 8,000 views as of October. These are not huge view numbers, suggesting that they were only viewed by those with a prior interest, rather than ‘going viral’ with wider fan base.  
*[TikTok videos are covered under Allegation 2]*
- We saw zero evidence of venues or football authorities catering to or encouraging ticketless fans. This conjecture (that BoxPark and others would exacerbate disorder by encouraging ticketless fans to visit) was unfounded.





## Specific allegations

**Allegation #1:** *links to private groups offering information/tips on how to "jib" were circulating on Twitter before the final.*

### Results:

- Our scan found 1 instance of a Telegram group being promoted on Twitter (see left). We searched for this link across other platforms and found no other live links
- 12 relevant tweets were identified, telling people to move to DMs or Follow users to receive the Telegram link
- The relevant tweet with most engagement had 11 replies
- There was 1 tweet that asked who wanted to be part of a Wembley jibbing group: tweet had 24 likes and 16 comments
- Overall likes across tweets: 131 (as of September 30)  
Overall retweets: 4 | Overall replies: 15 | Overall Quote tweets: 2





**Allegation #2:** *That people were boasting on social media about sneaking into Eng v Den without a ticket following the semi-final*

- Just 7 posts on Twitter boasted about ticketless entry to Eng v Den
- 3 of the posts included pictures of people inside Wembley
- The tweet with the most engagement had 11 likes and 0 retweets
- The post with the most retweets only had 1 retweet
- This level of engagement is insignificant as far as encouraging others
- We found no relevant content on Instagram, YouTube or Facebook


- On TikTok there was a video (referenced in the media coverage at [iNews](#)) which we looked at but has since been deleted. At the time we viewed it the video had fewer than 8,000 views and just 76 Likes. In the context of TikTok this is a very low level of engagement.

- The iNews article in question was shared 95 times, with an estimated reach of 28,500, and likely drove most of the views for that TikTok video. While that article was published on July 8th three days before the final, it did not receive much attention until after the incidents surrounding the final and the article was strongly critical of jibbing. Neither the article, nor the video will have inspired fans to jib.



**Allegation 3:** *That a steward posted an advert selling his bib and lanyard on Facebook on the day of the match*

- The core allegation is documented and under investigation
- No data relating to pay dissatisfaction amongst stewards was found
- There were numerous tweets pertaining to the fact that the security at Wembley stadium was not satisfactory. (We found zero discussion of this issue on Facebook, YouTube, TikTok or Instagram)
- We did find one YouTube video (at right) detailing a successful ticketless entry by a man wearing a high-vis jacket, but this was posted after the final, and the high vis was not standard issue. The video does support the notion of illegal activity being flaunted on social media, but has to date attracted fewer than 3,000 views.



**Allegation #4:** *That #wembleyjib was trending on Twitter on match day*

- This is categorically inaccurate
- Our analyst looked at all relevant Tweets from matchday, and we were able to access both live and deleted posts
- From that analysis we found:
  - 11 tweets in total including #wembleyjib
  - Overall likes: 57 [Post with the most likes had 25]
  - Overall retweets: 3 | Overall replies: 10 | Quote tweets 0




- Most posts and replies seem to be between people that know each other. In one case someone redirected a user to their Instagram dm's for more information, and another case where someone asked who wanted to be part of a group chat
- We also looked at #jib: this sub-tag appeared just 21 times in relation to the football



## Jibbing as 'the only option'


One notable aspect of our analysis was a high volume of posts presenting jibbing as 'the only option' or as a reasonable response to high ticket prices.



## Conclusions (recap)

- Public social media was not used to organise or incite disorder to a significant extent.
- There is scant evidence of fans showing off for social media and the vast majority of reactions to disorderly posts or bragging about ticketless entry are negative.
- Social media platforms played a role in exacerbating the events at Wembley, since the worst behaviour and the most shocking clips tended to go viral quickly, and social media feeds quickly filled with distressing images.
- Neither brands, sporting bodies, nor individuals used social media to invite or encourage ticketless fans to Wembley.
- A jibbing Telegram group did exist and a link to this group was promoted and mentioned a number of times on Twitter. The link was not prominent.
- Any social media user looking for tips on breaking into Wembley could have found relevant videos online after the semi-final, with advice offered by other social media users. However, none of these videos were 'viral' – users would only discover them with a proactive search.
- There was significant discussion before the game around exorbitant ticket pricing. However, only a small number of conversations moved on to discuss jibbing as a response.
- Most fans are repelled by lawless, drunken and disorderly behaviour, both online and offline. The vast majority of reactions to disorderly posts were negative, and fewer than 1% of posts incited disorderly behaviour. Please see next page for examples of posts condemning the behaviour of fans trying to jib the final.

## Fans condemn jibbing (examples)



## Appendix: About Signify

Signify are an ethical data science company dedicated to using machine learning and massive data sets to improve products, services and communication for the benefit of all. We have a three-stage ethical process for using owned and social data and this provides a useful starting point for the safe, legal and ethical use of public data throughout any project.

### **Step 1: Ensure corporate-level ethics and governance**

This encompasses safe, secure and legally compliant use and storage of data in a fashion that complies with GDPR and other privacy legislation. Having the highest possible standards for the use, storage and maintenance of data is a prerequisite for our blue-chip clients. Corporate ethics also covers the basic principle of truthfulness. There can be no exaggeration or distortion, either in our pitch or our results.

### **Step 2: Maintain a public charter**

At Signify we are clear about what the general public can expect from us in terms of respect for their privacy and safety. Since the public will never commission us, but we will use data that they created, it is our duty to ensure that no private individual is ever placed in danger, legislated against or inconvenienced, including a loss of privacy. There are two exceptions to this – when a person has a public profile, when there is a public interest, or suspicion of criminality or threat that obligates us to report it to the relevant authorities.

### **Step 3: Review the impact of our work**

This is important when Signify take on projects to map or counter the spread of fake news or incitement as we have done with racism in the UK and racially motivated killings abroad.

Any insight or categorisation derived from our work risks embedding injustice or creating new problems of classification, so we have to be intentional about the purpose and limits of our scope on any project.

In the course of our work, Signify have become closely involved in the protection of footballers, politicians and other high profile individuals from online abuse and we have developed a product, [Threat Matrix](#) that detects, flags and helps to moderate online abuse. We are currently working with player unions in football, basketball and athletics to help protect professionals and their families from online abuse and improve the experience of fans at every level of sport.



## **UEFA survey of registered ticket holders**

### **Introduction**

The Euro 2020 final was the most eagerly anticipated England game for over 50 years. This was reflected in viewing figures on the day of the final, with around 31 million tuning in to watch the match, making it the most-watched broadcast in the UK since the funeral of Princess Diana in 1997.<sup>1</sup>

For those supporters fortunate enough to have a ticket, the final was an opportunity to experience a 'once in a lifetime' occasion that may never come again. The final had added significance in the aftermath of a football season played for the majority behind closed doors and marked the return of the most important people in the game: the supporters.

Public support for the team grew significantly following the victory against Germany. The positivity continued as England defeated Denmark in the semi-final at Wembley in front of 65,000 spectators, the biggest football crowd since the pandemic began. Indeed the semi-final win led to scenes of jubilation all over the country - scenes which were endlessly replayed on television and social media.

The English supporters' adopted victory anthem - 'Sweet Caroline' - whose lyrics include the line, 'good times never seemed so good', was in keeping with a mood of national optimism. There was a sense that pride in the team had created the space for a 'compassionate, progressive and inclusive patriotism'.<sup>2</sup>

Unsurprisingly, demand for tickets ahead of the final was extremely high, with some newspapers reporting tickets being resold for as much as £20,000.<sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, many supporters who had tickets refused life-changing sums of money in the expectation that they would witness something historic for them and the country.

Given the importance of the match, it was therefore vital for this Review to understand the perspective of fans and hear directly how they experienced the events of the final and its impact on their views about supporting England generally.

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<sup>1</sup> Daily Mail, 12 July, 'England's devastating penalty defeat by Italy was the THIRD most watched TV event of all time with 31.1million viewers - only beaten by the 1966 World Cup and Diana's funeral' accessed online: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9779703/More-31million-people-watch-England-v-Italy-Euro-2020-final.html>

<sup>2</sup> The Athletic, 8 July, 'What Euro 2020 has revealed about Englishness' accessed online:

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/07/euro-2020-england-patriotism/619382/>

<sup>3</sup> Metro, 8 July, 'Euro final tickets sold for £20,000 each as fans battle to see historic clash' accessed online: <https://metro.co.uk/2021/07/08/euro-2020-england-v-italy-final-tickets-sold-for-20000-each-14897319/>

## Methodology

In order to test whether the issues identified in the Review aligned with the broader supporter experience, the Review team designed and commissioned a survey of England supporters, which was sent out to registered ticket holders by UEFA. Each individual was invited to answer a number of questions relating to issues identified through the course of the Review, such as anti-social behaviour, alcohol consumption and general security issues. Supporters were also asked to comment more broadly on their experience of the day.

7,707 people responded to the survey. Responses ranged from those supporters who had followed England home and away for over fifty years, to those who were attending a game for the first time. The findings need to be caveated by the fact that the sample is likely to reflect an element of selection bias: those who had strong views about Euro Sunday are, in all probability, more likely to have responded.

## Key findings


### *Alcohol Consumption*

Over half (53 per cent) of people who used the London Underground to get to the game witnessed “a lot” of alcohol consumption en route.

*“I saw a lot of people who had been drinking for a long period of time and were in a bad way. Both on the train and around the stadium.” - Review survey respondent*

The prevalence of alcohol increased as people arrived at Wembley Stadium - 91 per cent of people witnessed “a lot” of alcohol consumption upon arrival to the ground.

Attendees reporting alcohol consumption on arrival at Wembley stadium



In particular, supporters reported high levels of consumption outside Wembley and the surrounding area.


*“Wembley Way was full of drunks. The floor was sticky with beer and we waded through empty cans and bottles.”* - Review survey respondent

*“Many drunken people blocking the entrance, throwing alcohol over me and being excessively threatening.”* - Review survey respondent

### *Antisocial Behaviour and disorder*

More than two thirds (68 per cent) of fans reported witnessing antisocial behaviour on the day of the final. The peak time for these incidents was between 3pm and 5pm when 69 per cent witnessed “a lot” of anti-social behaviour and only 6 per cent witnessed none at all.

**Respondent's perception of anti-social behaviour around Wembley stadium by arrival time**



Survey respondents commented extensively on disorder outside the ground and a general atmosphere of drinking and drug taking as well as aggressive and violent intimidation of others supporters. This left many feeling unsafe.

*“An unsafe, hostile atmosphere in which I at no point felt safe.”* - Review survey respondent

*“I couldn't believe what I was seeing on Wembley Way, drug use, people urinating, bottles and cans being thrown, the stench in the air was disgusting and I'd never felt so unsafe in my life.”* - Review survey respondent

A number of fans reported witnessing incidents of violence between fans and stewards or police as the situation escalated throughout the day.

*“There was violence and anti-social behaviour. I felt unsafe and worried for the safety of myself and others.”* - Review survey respondent

*“There was fighting outside and inside in the game. I was stuck in the middle of multiple fights. Also my father in law was hit with glass. The whole experience was an absolute disgrace.”* - Review survey respondent

The level of visible anti-social behaviour and violence made it a particularly uncomfortable experience for those who had taken young children. A number of parents responded to the survey:

*“Too many drunk people who pushed their way in and started to abuse those near to them. My daughter was scared and I spent most of my time comforting her and pretending that everything was fine.”* - Review survey respondent


*“I was abused and insulted in front of my daughter who is 12 years old and all of that because I was an Italian supporter.”* - Review survey respondent

#### *Police Presence and Security*

Nearly three quarters of respondents (74 per cent) reported a lower policing and security presence than they expected for a game of this magnitude. By contrast, only 9 per cent of respondents said that they didn't think about police presence on the day.



**Respondent's perception of police presence around Wembley stadium**



One group who felt impacted by this were the small bubble of Italian fans who were able to travel into the country to watch the match. Their trip was facilitated by the Italian Fans' Embassy and Football Supporters Europe (FSE) who recounted their experience of the day.

*"We had a number of instances in the secure bubble, where England fans got in and the Italians who travelled, started to self police because there was no police presence."* - UEFA Fans Embassy Official


This also impacted on the families of England players who arrived to find fans in their section.

*"I had two full rows for families of players. But when I arrived there were people sitting in them. I asked them to move and they shuffled along. I told them that they were all mine. They just moved to the aisles. No security got involved for thirty minutes."* - Former FA Official

### *Drug use*

Well over half (59 per cent) of supporters witnessed some form of drug taking over the course of the day. In terms of prevalence, almost a quarter (22 per cent) witnessed "a lot" of drug taking.

**Attendees reporting illegal drug use around Wembley stadium**



The number of supporters who witnessed illegal drug taking inside the ground appeared to be lower than outside but still made up a significant proportion of total respondents. Four in ten supporters (39 per cent) witnessed an act of drug taking once they were inside. Indeed many made a point of commenting on this phenomenon:


*“People were taking cocaine in front of us and smoking drugs behind us. My sons cried for most of the game scared by the events surrounding us.”* - Review survey respondent

*“People threatening us as we asked them to move from our seats, snorting cocaine off their hands in the stands.”* - Review survey respondent

*“People Drunk, Vomiting anyway, Smoking weed, Selling Weed, Snorting Cocaine in the stands and in the toilets. The stand was well over capacity with groups of people standing wherever they could.”* - Review survey respondent

### *Threatening behaviour*

In addition to the reports of anti-social behaviour outside the ground, a large number of supporters said that they witnessed “threatening behaviour” once the match had kicked off. Just under half of respondents (44 per cent) said that they saw some kind of threatening behaviour during the match, with 17 per cent saying they saw “a lot”.



These findings were reinforced by a number of free-text comments, which referred to a general air of intimidation at the game and continued threats of violence when interventions were made:

*“One fan tried to hit me personally because I was saying not to boo the Italian national anthem. I witnessed a fight by the bar area and that was set off just because somebody bumped into someone else.” - Review survey respondent*


*“After Italy scored, a couple of drunk guys punched, unprovoked, a father and son, stirring up a section of the people witnessing it, resisting the stewards intervention and continuing undisturbed provoking other supporters and drinking.” - Review survey respondent*

*“A large group of drunken, drugged men (25yrs old approx) suddenly filled the area around us and spent the entire game shrieking racist chants, swear words etc. behind my 12yr son, when I asked them to tone it down due to my son being there they threatened violence etc.” - Review survey respondent*

#### *Impact of disorder on the overall fan experience*

The events and disorder outside the ground had a significant impact on the overall fan experience. Eight in ten respondents said that events outside the ground had a negative impact on their day, with 60 per cent saying it “made it much more negative”. By contrast, 13 per cent found that the events outside the ground enhanced their game day experience and created a more positive final experience.

How did the outside of the stadium before the match impact on your experience?



For those supporters who witnessed the breaches of gates, there was a heightened fear about the impact on security in the stadium. A number of supporters commented specifically on the absence of security checks and searches, which raised fears of a potential terror attack and the prospect of weapons entering the ground.

*"I was scared. There was absolutely no stewards or police outside the turnstiles. When I went through my turnstiles, there were no stewards manning the metal detectors as they were chasing people, who had ran in. I was scared of a terrorist attack as there were NO checks."* - Review survey respondent

This sense of fear was shared by the families of England players spoken to for this Review.

*"I remember the terror attack at Manchester Arena and when I saw people going through with bags unchecked I thought it's not safe. I couldn't believe how lax the security was."* - Partner of England player

The impact of ticketless fans inside the stadium angered those England and Italian supporters who had paid for tickets. Supporters complained at the unfairness at having paid hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of pounds to have their view of the stadium disrupted.

*"No one had tickets it seemed for the section. We paid over 2000 euros. It's an absolute disgrace. My children were in tears."* - Review survey respondent



*“Rude people. Pushing in the queue. Italian fans being pushed. I paid £3000 for my ticket and some people paid nothing. Not fair.” - Review survey respondent*


Representatives from the Football Supporters Association (FSA), the national representative body for football supporters in England and Wales, shared similar views with the Review.

*“In my many years as a football supporter I have never been as uncomfortable in my life. I would normally have taken the kids but I was so glad that I didn't as it might have put them off the game for life.” - FSA Representative*

#### *Supporter views on ticketless and antisocial England fans*

The events of Euro Sunday represent only the latest episode in the long-running debate about the behaviour of England fans in major tournaments. However, the Review survey findings suggest that the overwhelming majority of England fans do not believe that the behaviour of the ticketless hordes was representative of England's broader support.

Asked what proportion of England fans who got into Wembley without tickets were like them, 19 per cent said “none”, 26 per cent said “very few” and 25 percent said “a small minority”.




When ticket holders were asked what proportion of England fans were like those who were involved in antisocial behaviour and violence around Wembley, 15 per cent said “none”, 23 per cent said “very few” and 24 per cent said “a small minority”.

### *Enforcement*


Most supporters repudiate the type of behaviour seen on Euro Sunday, according to the survey, which found broad fan support for tough measures to clamp down on disorder.

The survey suggests that most fans are hostile and intolerant of ‘jibbing’, with 80 per cent believing that people who try to get into a football match without a ticket should face criminal prosecution, and either a fine or a ban from attending football matches.



Despite the apparent prevalence of illegal drug taking both outside and inside the ground, there was an overwhelming majority of support from ticket holders for a tougher response on those engaged in such activities. The survey found that 78 per cent of ticket holders believe that those who take illegal drugs before or during a football match should face criminal prosecution, with a fine or ban from attending football matches.

These results were supported by a strong stance on the issue of anti-social behaviour at football matches. Over three quarters (76%) of respondents believe those who engage in antisocial behaviour at football matches should face criminal prosecution, with a fine or ban from attending football matches. This was backed up by another 96 per cent of respondents who said people who engage in violence or aggressive behaviour should face criminal prosecution, with a fine or ban from attending football matches.




### *Watching England at Wembley*

The survey suggests most England supporters consider these events to be an aberration - the vast majority are still keen to come to Wembley to support the national team.

Nearly three quarters (71 per cent ) of respondents said they were interested in watching England at Wembley again - with 37 per cent “extremely interested” and 17 per cent “very interested”.

### How interested would you be in going to Wembley to see England play in the future?



### Conclusion

The survey findings set out in this report provide important first-hand testimony about the events of July 11. They confirm many of the Review's wider research findings, in particular, underscoring the role of drugs and alcohol in fuelling the shocking disorder seen outside Wembley Stadium and indicating that the policing and stewarding operation fell short. Most England fans who attended the final did so in the expectation and hope that they would witness an event that would be remembered forever in our nation's history. It is a sad irony that while the final is likely to be remembered, it will be because the actions of reckless individuals brought the tournament into disrepute.