How Spain and Barcelona play

When Iker Casillas lifted the FIFA World Cup in South Africa 2010, the Spanish had their hands on the world’s most sought after trophy.

The silverware confirmed what many had been saying for some time: world and European football had a reference point and benchmark.

Propelled by the success of FC Barcelona the status of Spanish football has been strengthened. Ever since Josep Guardiola graduated to become head coach at the Nou Camp in 2008, their beguiling passing patterns, movement and high-tempo pressing has elevated the Catalonians to a pedestal to which all in the domestic game are now compared. The concept of Tika-Taka has been ingrained in world football’s conscience.

With the Spanish national side heavily populated with Barcelona representative’s it was unsurprising that success at national level developed concurrently. High praise is valid. Vincent Del Bosque’s national team have shared comparison with the great sides’ of world football: Holland 1974 and Brazil 1982. Guardiola’s Barcelona are being talked of as the best club side ever.

Given this success it is unsurprising that a clamour for emulation often ensues. Caution must be applied however. A philosophy or culture conducive in one setting may prove unattainable in another. What is undeniable, however, is the benefit of learning more about the methods which have helped bring international and domestic success to Spain, considering their application in different contexts.

The following article provides a brief summary of some of the contributory factors to this success. Unfortunately, not all of these areas can be covered in the detail they deserve here. It is hoped that the points raised encourage coaches to further research and study.

Football history

Spain have had to wait for their turn in the international spotlight; success at national level being a relatively recent occurrence. Before their recent trophy haul (World Cup 2010, European Championships 2008) you have to go back to the Barcelona Olympics in 1992 and the European Championships in 1964, for evidence of trophy success. It is a barren spell many national teams have endured.

La Roja qualified for six consecutive World Cups between 1986 and 2006 but progressed no further than the quarter-finals. Although considered an unsuccessful spell for the senior team, the period is significant for the development and achievement in Spain’s younger age-groups. In 1999 the Spanish won the U20 World Cup in Nigeria. In 2003 Spain’s U17 and U20 team’s finished second in their respective World Cup campaigns. These achievements highlighted the cultivation of a conveyor-belt of talented players proficient in the Spanish philosophy and style. Reward would follow.

Notably, Spain have won 9 titles at Youth Level (U17 – U21) and interestingly, many of these successes have occurred after 2000. Spain’s U21 and U19 were both crowned European Champions in 2011, providing further proof of the depth of young talent and a nod towards things to come.

Consistency of selection

Continuity, consistency and experience are threads which run through Spain’s youth system. The number of youth caps amassed by prominent senior players is one indicator of the significance of these principles. Andres Iniesta (46 youth appearances), David Silva (54), Xavi Hernandez (57) indicate the importance of identifying a core group of young players applying patience and dedication to their development, with promotion to the senior set-up given due consideration.

Persistence is another reoccurring theme. In 2006, 12 of the current squad were prominent as Spain were knocked out of the World Cup by France. In an 18 month period around the tournament, David Villa, Sergio Ramos, Cesc Fabregas, David Silva and Andres Iniesta all made their international debuts. In 2006, the senior team, containing many of these players, lost to both Sweden and Northern Ireland in the Euro 2008 qualifiers. Such reversals could have triggered wholesale change or clamour for a new way. The Spanish, however, remained true to their vision: maintenance of a core of players, with the timely addition of individuals promoted from the youth squads. What followed was a significant feat: a world-record equalling 35-match unbeaten international run culminating in the capture of the European Championship trophy in 2008.

Responding to claims that the Spanish had lacked tournament experience ahead of the 2008 Final, midfielder Iniesta said: “Nothing could be further from the truth. We were all used to tournament football and winning big competitions at youth level. We were one of the most experienced teams here.” The youth policy had paid dividends.

The appearance statistics of senior internationals gives further credence to the importance of continuity and consistency. Senior fixtures are consistently populated with key players. Between September 2010 and the end of 2011 only 28 players started Spain’s 17 international fixtures. This is true for the non-competitive games against Costa Rica, USA, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela and England. This policy is one which has been adopted for some time and, notably, only 13 players started the two preparation games ahead of their Euro 2008 success. The consistent use of their strongest players brings an interesting angle to the ‘burn-out’ debate often cited in discussion regarding international success.

Barcelona

With Spain’s national side populated with the same core of players which have lead Barcelona to success, any discussion of the two teams prompts symmetry. Since Pep Guardiola was appointed as head coach at Nou Camp in Summer 2008, Barcelona have enjoyed unprecedented success. Three La Liga titles and two UEFA Champions League trophies represent more than a significant haul.

Investigation into Barcelona’s success, inevitably, leads to La Masia, the youth development factory with an alumni list which is the envy of the world. Pique, De La Pena, Puyol, Reina, Pedro, Valdes, Xavi, Guardiola, Arteta, Amor, Busquets, Valdes, Fabregas, Ferrer, Luis Garcia, Messi, Iniesta, Bojan, Thiago Motta and Thiago Alcantara were all schooled there. The quality of graduate is undeniable.

Over 300 players, starting from age six, attend La Masia (which, since the beginning of this season moved to the Ciudad Deportiva, a new multi-million pound complex) forming 12 teams. It comes as no surprise to learn that the curriculum champions the development of technical excellence - producing responses to game situations at high-speed, athleticism, speed, and an in-depth knowledge of tactical play.

In addition to the development of technique it is the cultivation of young players in the Barcelona way, that provokes much interest. This is best described by Guardiola himself: “The player who has passed through our youth system at La Masia has something different to the rest, it’s a plus that only comes from having competed in a Barcelona shirt from the time when you were a child”.

Given the global success achieved by those who adorn the Blaugrana, some exception may have been afforded if there were sign of inflated egos. However, a sense of humility pervades, a quality which can be traced to the family values and work ethic promoted throughout the club, in particular through the youth system.

Consistency of selection

Similar to Spain’s approach to team selection, Guardiola operates in much the same way. Player usage remains consistent: the best players play most often. This approach, coupled with their repeated success in numerous competitions, has meant Barcelona’s players have played more games in recent seasons than many of their English counterparts. Any comparison between the Premier League and La Liga should, of course, give due consideration to the competitiveness, intensity and physicality of La Liga and any benefit of a winter break, however, all said this adds an interesting perspective to the notion that English players play too many games.

Patterns of play: the dizzying carousel

It is arguably in their playing style that Barcelona and Spain project their identity most clearly. Before the Champions League Final in 2009, Sir Alex Ferguson said: “They get you on that carousel and make you dizzy with their passing”. German National team coach, Joachim Low, extended similar plaudits: “They play in an automatic way, with everyone knowing what is expected of them. When they want to be they are in complete control. They dominate opponents and games.”

Their approach is notable in as much that the statistics show evolution in method. Barcelona averaged over 775 passes per-game in their 2011 Champions League campaign, a significantly greater statistic than that achieved by other previous winners. The average number of passes per team, per match, in the Champions League in 2010/11 was 403. This approach, based on complete dominance of the possession, also shows evolution of their own style: in 2006, Barcelona averaged only 522 passes per Champions League game. It is significant that this style-change coincided with Pep Guardiola’s appointment as head coach in 2008.

Playing out from the back

With such exclusivity of ball-ownership it is unsurprising that Barcelona enjoyed territorial dominance in all of their Champions League games in the 2010/11 campaign; the platform for this style is found in their own defensive third. In the 2010-2011 Champions League competition, Barca played 82% of their goalkeeper distributions short (to a player inside their own defensive third), the highest percentage of any team in the competition. Even when pressed high up the field, the opposition rarely found them waver from their beliefs: centre-backs splitting wider, often to the touchline, with a midfielder, often Sergio Busquets, dropping to receive the ball from the goalkeeper Victor Valdes or one of the centre-backs.

Build up play: passing triangles and one-two’s

Central areas of the pitch often appear congested when Barcelona progress play through the thirds. The high concentration of their players in relatively small pockets of space provide the player in possession with multiple passing options. Patience is commonplace, with the ball often ‘shared’ around, with bounce passes repeated sequentially: pass, adjust position, receive ball back, repeat. As the ball is rotated on this ‘carousel’, observation of forward players’ movement is constant. Sensing an opportunity to penetrate defensive lines, quick and incisive one-two’s, played with accuracy and often through congested areas around the opposition’s penalty-area are commonly the chosen method in creating goal-scoring opportunities.

Advanced full-backs

With forward and midfield players occupying central areas Barcelona’s penetration from wide positions is often provided by full-backs. This is best summarised in review of Dani Alves’s statistics from the Champions League Final in 2011. The Brazilian made 57 accurate passes, 33 of which were completed in the opponents half, registering one strike on goal and one assist. A scattergraph of Alves’s positioning throughout the game shows the Brazilian spent the majority of the game in opposition territory. Dominance of possession in central areas allows full-backs to adopt advanced attacking positions. Although Barcelona’s style is defined by possession football it should be highlighted that long, accurate, quick switches of play are also used to significant effect, often releasing full-backs in advanced positions.

Fluidity of front players

Attempts to define the organisation of Barcelona’s attacking unit can prove complex. Based around the arrangement of three players –commonly Lionel Messi, David Villa and Pedro – positioning and movement is fluid and ever changing, responding to the position of the ball and the location of the defenders. It is common to see the front three arranged with one central attacker, one withdrawn/ deep lying forward and one wide-player. Likewise, this can spring to three central attackers together, three attackers on one flank or two attackers on one flank with one central. Barcelona’s use of the ball in the final-third is unsurpassed. Guardiola’s men recorded the highest pass completion rate of any winning team studied over the past 20 years of Champions League and international competitions: 81% in the 2010-2011 competition (Opta statistics).

Space between the lines and threat in behind

Although attacking positioning is fluid and interchangeable, certain threats remain constant. Opposition defenders have two dilemmas: the threat in-behind and the threat of the player who drops deep to receive. It is common for the central attacker, often Messi, to drop deep – sometimes as deep as central midfield - seeking space in between the opposition’s defensive lines in which to receive, turn and attack the opposition. With Messi often tempting defenders out of their traditional lines, the creation of space allow opportunities for wide players to make incisive runs in-behind the opponents’ back-line. The unerring passing accuracy and speed of distribution possessed by midfielders Xavi, Iniesta, Fabregas and Busquets mean any uncertainty in defensive positioning is often seized upon.

Summary

It should be highlighted that the approaches outlined here have not always proved successful (the strategies and tactics which have been deployed to defeat both Barcelona and Spain will be discussed in future articles). On the whole, however, recent football history shows that the Spanish are setting the trend for the evolution of the game. With the European Championships and the latter stages of the Champions League both forthcoming, it will be interesting to observe the methods adopted to counter their approach. Faced with these inevitable attempts to stifle, it will be most intriguing to see how both Spain and Barcelona continue to redefine themselves.

Steve O'Brien is the FA men's lead performance analyst. 

John Peacock is the former FA head of coaching and England U17 head coach.

This article was first published in The Boot Room magazine in April 2012.